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The last half a century has witnessed a burgeoning information
revolution that has transformed our societies beyond recognition.
The development of sophisticated computing, the technological
reorientation of vast segments of the global workforce, the invention
of the internet and most recently the proliferation of social media
technology has radically changed the ways we work, live, develop
and communicate. Political extremism and violent radicalism have
not been excluded from this growing trend, with social media being
used as a tool for the recruitment and exploitation of young people
by extremist groups.
As a result, the development of digital citizenship in our young
people, to help them navigate these new online challenges, has
become an urgent need. British schools are responsible for
identifying and building resilience against radicalisation as part of
their duty of care. Many of the skills required to combat the
influence of extremism and the ability of terrorist groups to exploit
and manipulate young people are already taught in schools, through
existing personal, social, health and economic (PSHE) education
and citizenship efforts, the British values agenda and the work of
individual school leaders and teachers. However, there is a dearth of
high quality resources designed to increase the resilience of young
people to extremism and radicalisation in a digital context.
This report summarises the results of a pilot project which seeks
to address this gap by developing, testing and evaluating new
resources to help schools tackle online radicalisation. Based on the
analysis of a survey of existing materials and a best practise review, it
presents a digital citizenship intervention, developed by Demos and
Bold Creative, designed to build this resilience to extremism, and
measures its impact through a pilot study delivered in schools.At a
time when the growth of social media combined with the influence
of extremism makes it more important than ever, this report adds to
the public evidence base regarding counter-extremism interventions
in a school context, and contributes to the development of effective
education for digital citizenship. 
Ralph Scott is Head of the Citizenship programme at Demos. 
Louis Reynolds is a researcher in the Citizenship programme.
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Executive summary
9
If the contemporary world is defined by a single trend above all
others, it is defined by the burgeoning information revolution
that has transformed our societies beyond recognition over the
course of the last half century. The development of sophisticated
computing, the technological reorientation of vast segments of
the global workforce, the invention of the internet and most
recently the proliferation of social media technology has
radically changed the ways we work, live, develop, communicate
and even how we understand each other.
Social media touch on every aspect of our lives. They are
transforming our culture, our politics, even our relationships. We
live increasingly significant sections of our lives partially or even
wholly online. Young people in the UK spend on average more
than a day a week on social media.1 Yet our education system
dedicates minimal time to the discussion of the civic and moral
questions this new digital commons throws up, or to the
provision of the skills young people need to be informed, critical
and effective citizens in this new context.
At the same time, our rapidly changing societies are
confronted, increasingly aggressively, by new expressions of a
much older problem – political extremism and violent
radicalism. The role social media play in the recruitment and
exploitation of young people by extremist groups, in the
propagation of the narratives of violent radical organisation and
in the distribution of misinformation should highlight the
urgency of addressing this issue.
British schools are responsible for identifying and building
resilience against radicalisation as part of their duty of care.
Many of the skills required to combat the influence of extremism
and the ability of terrorist groups to exploit and manipulate
young people are already taught in schools, through existing
personal, social, health and economic (PSHE) education and
citizenship efforts, the British values agenda and the work of
individual school leaders and teachers. However, there is a
dearth of high quality resources designed to increase the
resilience of young people to extremism and radicalisation in a
digital context, and those explicitly digital citizenship resources
that do exist do not substantively address extremism online. At
the same time, the school-based development of digital
citizenship in our young people, to help them navigate these new
online challenges, has become an urgent need.
Education for digital citizenship is not just an effective way
to increase the resilience of young people to extremism. It can
create more critical citizens, informed consumers and
community-minded social media users. The skills developed
through digital citizenship education are not just applicable to
the fight against extremism on the margins of our society – they
present an important way to reduce the political polarisation that
runs through the heart of our society.
This report
In this report we present our research on best practice in
educational interventions designed to increase resilience to
extremism through the development of digital citizenship skills,
describe an educational intervention we have designed in
partnership with Bold Creative to achieve this, and present our
evaluation of a pilot study we have conducted within four
secondary schools seeking to measure its impacts.
Chapter 1 explains the new Prevent duty for schools,
describes what digital citizenship consists of, and examines what
gaps there are in the landscape of resources which deal with the
online aspects of extremism and radicalisation, establishing what
skills a new digital-citizenship-based Prevent intervention for
schools should teach. Chapter 2 presents the context for this
intervention, describes the changing social media landscape in
which young people find themselves and the changing profile of
extremism online, and makes the case for a digital-citizenship-
based approach to countering extremism.
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Chapter 3 presents our analysis of best practice in school-
based countering violent extremism (CVE) and safeguarding
interventions in order to inform the design of our intervention,
drawing on interviews with 11 key stakeholders in CVE, Prevent
delivery, educational interventions and public policy, and a
review of nine evaluations and meta-evaluations of comparable
interventions. It also presents our rapid review of 12 existing
digital citizenship resources. Chapter 4 describes the inter-
vention piloted as part of this project, the design process, 
the resources developed and their key characteristics, and
outlines the theory of change underpinning the intervention 
as a whole.
Chapter 5 presents the evaluation of the pilot project,
describing the impact of the intervention and assessing the
delivery process. The report concludes in chapter 6 with a
number of observations related to the success of the pilot, the
future delivery of this intervention, and the implications of this
project for digital citizenship as a vehicle for CVE efforts in
schools.
Best practice findings
We carried out a best practice review of school-based CVE and
safeguarding interventions and interviewed experts. The results
informed the design of our intervention. More broadly, they
provide some useful observations on what types of interventions
are likely to be most effective in this space, and what
considerations those designing such interventions should take
into account. These were the key findings of this review:
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· For longer-term impacts, interventions should focus on concrete
skills development rather than on general, ideological messaging.
· The objectives of the intervention should be clearly stated at the
beginning and restated throughout.
· Discussions allowing the expression and exploration of social
and religious identities, and the promotion of positive social
narratives, are an important part of extremism-related
interventions.
· The delivery of interventions by external delivery staff is often a
superior alternative to delivery by teachers. Deliverers should be
both credible experts and understand the curriculum.
· The intervention should consider a broad range of types of
extremism, including Islamist and far right, to prevent particular
students feeling alienated.
· Young people respond well to leading the dialogue within the
intervention, and a dialogue-based rather than a didactic
approach is often more effective. This can be successfully
facilitated by role play.
· Content should be eye-opening, realistic and relevant to the
situation of the participants, and presented with the appro-
priate sensitivity.
· The delivery of the session should be tailored to differing
perspectives, attitudes and levels of knowledge within 
different groups.
· The impact an intervention seeks to achieve should be realistic,
limited and aligned with the time available in which to deliver
the programme.
· The intervention should be directly related to the needs of
schools and pupils and ideally tied into the broader curriculum
for greatest effect.
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The resource development and pilot study
Demos and Bold Creative developed a digital citizenship
intervention designed to build the resilience of participants to
extremism and radicalisation online. We based it on our research,
a survey of existing materials and best practice review. The
intervention used an interactive digital presentation deck and
printed cards facilitating the examination and discussion of real
examples of extremism and hate speech online.
This intervention sought to teach young people how to
recognise online propaganda and manipulation, understand how
social media change how we communicate, and develop a sense
of responsibility over their online social networks. It was
designed for delivery in two one-hour sessions, separated by a
week, as part of a PSHE or citizenship lesson.
Demos and Bold Creative undertook a pilot study of this
intervention, delivering it through two workshops, in one class,
in four schools. Demos then evaluated the pilot.
Evaluation findings
Our evaluation of this pilot project allowed us to measure the
impact of our digital citizenship intervention, and to conduct a
process evaluation to inform its future refinement and delivery.
In summary, in all three areas that were the focus of the
intervention – critical thinking skills, digital citizenship and how
social media change how we communicate – the pilot project had
statistically significant impacts. The intervention was viewed
favourably by teachers, and participants felt they were relevant,
understood them and enjoyed them.
The key findings of the evaluation, which are based on pre-
and post-surveys in participants and comparison groups, focus
groups with participants and interviews with classroom teachers,
are discussed below.
Impact evaluation
In considering the impact evaluation it is important to note that
this experimental pilot evaluation had a comparison group
design – described in detail in the section ‘Evaluation method’ in
chapter 5 – within a sample of four schools. The key outcomes
reported below are changes in the participant group over the
course of taking part in the programme, which are compared
with changes in the comparison group. Thus the project
approaches level 3 of Nesta’s standards of evidence, which makes
it possible to attribute some causality to the intervention.2
However, participants and comparison group members
were not selected randomly. As a result, and because of the small
sample, although it is possible to derive statistical significance
for large changes, it is more difficult to draw wide conclusions
about the effectiveness of the pilot project. This might be possible
with an enhanced sample size and randomisation, for example by
using a randomised controlled trial (RCT) type model.
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These are the key findings of the impact evaluation:
· Over the course of the programme there was a statistically
significant (10 per cent) increase in participants’ confidence that
they could distinguish between truth and lies on social media.
· There was a statistically significant (12 per cent) increase in
participants’ confidence that they understand what techniques
are used to manipulate people on social media.
· There was a statistically significant (10 per cent) increase in
participants’ confidence that they would know what to do if
confronted with hate speech online.
· The intervention had a statistically significant positive effect on
participants’ understanding of key terms associated with online
discourse – particularly ‘echo chamber’ and ‘keyboard warriors’.
· Both the surveys and focus groups showed that participants
overwhelmingly felt they had gained knowledge and new skills
from the workshops: 89 per cent said that they had learned some
or learned lots of new skills and knowledge, and 94 per cent of
participants reported that they understood ‘some’ or ‘all’ of the
content by the end of the workshops.
· The analysis of the civic judgement scenarios in the pre- and
post-surveys suggest that the intervention made participants
more likely to report extremist material or hate speech online to
the police, and less likely to take actions that purely benefit
themselves. Participants were also less likely to justify their
actions on emotional or selfish grounds, and more likely to
justify them through more constructive, solution-orientated
reasoning.
Process evaluation
The process evaluation returned positive results, and the
qualitative data attested to the efficacy of the programme, while
also providing feedback for future improvements. Participants:
· largely felt that the content of the intervention was relevant to
them; 77 per cent felt that the workshops were quite or highly
relevant to them
Executive summary 
· overwhelmingly enjoyed the workshops; 80 per cent liked the
workshops or liked them a lot
· almost entirely felt the workshops were age appropriate for
them, with 92 per cent suggesting the workshops were pitched
at the right age; 3 per cent felt they were more appropriate for
older students, and 3 per cent thought they were more
appropriate for younger students
15

1 Introduction
17
The aim of a life can only be to increase the sum of freedom and responsi-
bility to be found in every man and woman in the world. It cannot, under
any circumstances, be to reduce or suppress that freedom, even temporarily.
Albert Camus, 1960
This chapter introduces the concepts and context that
inform the research and approach to the Prevent intervention we
designed. It describes the new Prevent duty for statutory bodies
including schools, explains what our concept of digital
citizenship consists of, and examines what gaps there are in the
landscape of resources which deal with the online aspects of
extremism and radicalisation. In doing so, this chapter seeks to
establish what skills a new digital-citizenship-based Prevent
intervention should look like. It further explains why Demos is
well placed to produce those resources.
The Prevent duty
In July 2015, under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act 2015, all schools became subject to what is known as
the Prevent duty. This duty holds that ‘a specified authority
must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need
to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’.3 There is
now a more rigorous set of proactive requirements for schools to
implement to protect students, and challenge the narratives and
ideas that give sustenance to extremists and terrorist groups.4
Many schools already undertook such work, particularly in
Prevent priority areas, before the act was passed. Now, all
schools are required to do so.
This new duty was designed to reduce the vulnerability of
young people to extremism, and ensure that young people are
safeguarded effectively from those who would draw them into
terrorism. Its introduction was part the government’s wider
agenda to challenge terrorism at its root, and challenge
extremism in its broader form. The act followed revelations in
2014 about the existence of the so-called Operation Trojan 
Horse – an organised effort to introduce ultra-conservative
Islamist values into several schools in Birmingham.5 As the act
was passed, the threat of young people being drawn in by
extremist rhetoric of the Salafi–Jihadist group Islamic State was
tragically demonstrated in Bethnal Green, where three
schoolgirls – Amira Abase, Shamima Begum and Kadiza Sultana
– left home to join the Islamic State, in a case of radicalisation
and manipulation in which social media, as well as the school
environment, played a critical role.6
In order to discharge the Prevent duty effectively, schools
and teachers need suitable resources and guidance to inform and
support their efforts, to help them work successfully in
partnership with local authorities, to train staff to identify at-risk
children and bridge sensitive discussions around extremism, and
to help pupils stay safe online.
Digital citizenship
In this report we argue that digital citizenship education must
play a vital role in the delivery of the Prevent duty. To build
resilience to extremism effectively, young people online have to
be able to critically evaluate the arguments and media content
presented by extremists, to safeguard each other successfully
online, and to understand how social media change the dynamics
of communication and how we interact with each other online.
Effective digital citizenship education, designed with these needs
in mind and with a specific reflection on extremism, can be the
vehicle for the development of this resilience.
The concept of citizenship itself is complex, and in order 
to define the terms of any educational intervention based on
digital citizenship, some clear definitions are necessary. An
exploration of the definition of citizenship further supports the
argument that digital citizenship is critical to building resilience
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to extremism. It also highlights what is currently missing 
in the otherwise excellent array of resources currently available
to schools.
There are many definitions of citizenship applied in
different contexts. A number of sociologists and political
scientists refer to citizenship as having three dimensions:
citizenship as a legal status, defined by civil, political and social
rights; citizenship as political agency, and active participation in
political institutions; and citizenship as membership of a
political community that is a distinct source of identity.7 Another
definition of citizenship, provided by the Citizenship Foundation
and formed in an educational context, is ‘the effective, informed
engagement of individuals in their communities and in broader
society around issues relating to the public domain’.8
Digital citizenship, therefore, might be defined as the civil,
political and social rights of a citizen in their online activities,
their political engagement and activity through digital means,
and their membership of an online community that is a distinct
source of identity. In an educational context, it might be defined
as ‘the effective, informed engagement of individuals in their
communities, whether local or digital, and in broader society
around issues relating to the public domain’.
Digital citizenship education goes beyond teaching online
safety, and seeks to inform and engage pupils in order to give
them the skills and dispositions they need to be capable digital
citizens. It seeks to develop young people who are more active
and informed in their citizenry online – more likely to intervene
positively in negative situations online, more likely to consume
online information critically, more likely to engage positively in
online social and political discussions, and to understand the
dynamics of social media and how they change our
communications. All of these skills are critical to building the
individual and collective resilience of young people to extremism
and radicalisation.
The government has gone some way to providing the
resources and tools necessary for schools to carry out their new
Prevent duty, for example through the Department of Education’s
website Educate Against Hate (http://educateagainsthate.com/),
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which draws together existing resources, or the funding of new
initiatives such as the project that is the subject of this report.
Many effective CVE resources already exist, and indeed many of
the skills required to combat the influence of extremism and the
ability of terrorist groups to exploit and manipulate young
people are already taught in schools, through existing PSHE and
citizenship efforts, the British values agenda and the work of
individual school leaders and teachers.
However, despite the range of excellent resources available,
none have yet drawn together the digital citizenship elements
highlighted above (and explored in the next chapter) effectively
in the context of CVE education, which are critical to building
the resilience of young people to extremism and the delivery of
the Prevent duty: critical thinking and media literacy in the
context of manipulative argument and extremist propaganda;
knowledge of the social effects of social media – how they
change our communications with each other and can support
extremist opinion; and knowledge of online responsibilities 
and how to undertake peer safeguarding in the context of
extremism successfully.
Demos’ contribution
Demos has recognised gaps in the existing market of digital
citizenship interventions, highlighted in chapter 3 by reviewing
briefly 12 existing digital citizenship resources. While the current
range of resources can support wider digital citizenship needs
effectually, there are few which address radicalisation or
extremism, and none which do so in the context of critical
thinking, media literacy and our online rights and responsibilities.
There are no resources which can be delivered in classrooms that
deal with the threat of extremism in an online context and with a
view to the Prevent duty, and there are none which draw together
critical thinking, media literacy, online responsibilities and peer
safeguarding – skills critical to the development of resilience to
extremism and radicalisation online. Thus schools wishing to
build resilience to extremism and radicalisation online through a
skills-based approach have few resources to draw on.
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When developing our intervention Demos has sought to
address this problem, and to contribute to the evidence base of
what works and what does not in CVE-relevant interventions
(whose content is pertinent to violent extremism but does not
explicitly discuss it) and in CVE-specific interventions (whose
content specifically discusses violent extremism). In recent years
there has been a move towards evidence-based policy-making
within education policy, characterised by the foundation of the
Education Endowment Fund and a new focus on What Works
centres. Yet despite the new Prevent duty on schools, levels of
evidence of CVE interventions are very poor, with few publicly
published studies available even after more than a decade of the
Prevent strategy being in place, partly as a result of the
sensitivity of the subject matter.
As the threat profile facing the UK evolves, and as civil
society organisations come to play a more significant role in the
development and delivery of the Prevent strategy, improving the
level of evidence available – and therefore the quality of activity
– is a priority. Higher levels of publicly available evidence will
not just help policy-makers decide what works and what does
not, but also ensure that future development efforts do not
repeat work previously undertaken elsewhere, and that mistakes
are not repeated.
Why Demos?
Demos has a long pedigree of undertaking research related to
social media, extremism and radicalisation, and the development
of educational interventions.
Through the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media
(CASM), Demos has been at the forefront of social media
analytic science – not least through the development of the
Method52 data mining and natural language processing 
machine – as well as the application of social science to the
digital commons. CASM research on the online aspects of
extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, from the reports The 
New Face of Digital Populism on far-right populism in Europe 
to State of the Art on how terrorist groups use social media,
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provides the specialist research background for this 
project.9
Concurrently, Demos has conducted extensive research into
character education and how best to achieve attitudinal and
behavioural change through educational interventions, for
example with the reports Character Nation, on the evidence
behind character education, and Mind Over Matter, on growth
mindsets.10 Demos has also developed significant expertise in the
design, evaluation and implementation of non-formal
educational interventions, including by evaluating two major
character-based educational interventions, Character By Doing
and On the Front Foot.11
This combination of subject-matter expertise and
experience in the evaluation of non-formal educational
interventions puts Demos in a unique position to develop a
digital citizenship education intervention. To strengthen the
implementation and delivery of the intervention Demos teamed
up with staff at the agency Bold Creative, who through their
Digital Disruption project have significant hands-on delivery
experience of counter-extremism interventions.
In this project Demos designed, produced and delivered an
experimental intervention, then evaluated it through a pilot
scheme. This project had a number of distinct objectives,
including how to approach a CVE-focused digital citizenship
intervention most effectively, to add to the evidence base
regarding CVE interventions in schools, and to develop a suite of
helpful resources that could be deployed practically in schools.
Having evaluated the intervention and found promising
positive results, Demos is keen to build on this work to further
develop the suite of resources available, and to continue to
deliver these resources in schools. In doing so, Demos will 
seek to support CVE practically in a way that equips young
people with the skills that they need in the 21st century, and
empowers them to be effective and considered citizens in the
social media space.
Introduction
2 Changing social media
technologies and online
behaviour
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This chapter presents more detail on the context for this
intervention, and justifies why such an intervention is required.
It describes the changing social media landscape in which young
people find themselves, characterised by the diversification of
social media, the growth of small-group, closed social media
services and the proliferation of encryption, along with a host of
civic challenges from echo chambers to hate speech. It also
describes the changing profile of extremism online, including the
growing power of extremist voices on mainstream social media,
and the new challenges presented to law enforcement agencies
and intelligence services by technological change.
In so doing, it argues that a digital-citizenship-based
approach to countering extremism is required, to increase the
resilience of young people to extremism of all types, and to
create more informed, engaged and effective citizens in this
increasingly pivotal space.
The changing social media landscape
The diversification of social media, the growth of small-group,
closed social media platforms and the proliferation of encryption
– particularly among young people and extremists – poses new
challenges to law enforcement agencies and intelligence services
seeking to limit the activities of extremists online.
Given the crucial role that social media now play within
our society across the political, social and cultural spheres –
particularly a relatively small handful of very large platforms – it
is easy to falsely assume their relative permanence. Yet the social
media giants of today, most prominently Facebook and Twitter,
are both less than a decade old, and have been in popular use for
a shorter time still.12 The social media landscape changes rapidly,
with new technologies and platforms responding to the changing
demands and behaviour of consumers.
Over the last few years, small-group social media platforms
have become a mainstream part of the social media activity of
many people – particularly the younger generation. Applications
like WhatsApp and Snapchat, more attractive than previous
small-group social media platforms because of their user-friendly
nature, the new capabilities they present and the decreasing cost
of data, have over 1 billion and over 200 million monthly active
users respectively.13 Yet these applications are only seven and 
five years old.14 The emergence of these and other new 
platforms – Periscope, Kik, Telegram – fulfil differing functions,
and point to the ongoing diversification of social media, as well
as sensitive responses to shifting user behaviour, demands and
market conditions.
No groups have responded more quickly to this
diversification and the emergence of small-group social media
platforms than the two that sit at the heart of this project –
extremists, violent or otherwise, and young people. It is the most
technologically savvy groups – those consumers with the greatest
stake in the exploitation of effective technology – that react most
rapidly.15 Behaviour is tied to technological change, and
technology changes quickly. What is more, these two groups
adapt to this new social media landscape in the same ways.
Success stories like Snapchat, Instagram, Tumblr and ASKfm are
measured in the numbers of users that adopt the technology.
With a few notable exceptions, the relative uptake of each
platform among the broader population and among extremists is
broadly similar.16
A parallel trend to the increasing diversification of social
media platforms and use of closed-group social media platforms
has been the mainstreaming of encryption. Almost all the major
platforms are now encrypted, and the messages sent between
users are encrypted.17 Messages sent on new social media
platforms, like Telegram and Snapchat, self-destruct.18 Files
posted to JustPaste.it or conversations held on Whisper or
Thoughts Around Me (TAM) are anonymous.19 This use of
encryption has traditionally been where the widest gulf exists
Changing social media technologies and online behaviour 
between extremist use and use by the wider population – yet
over the last few years, this gulf has begun to narrow in
meaningful ways. Yet the key to the size of this gulf is simply
usability, and in the past few years there has been a surge in
encrypted apps like Telegram, WhatsApp and Snapchat that are
designed to be user-friendly.20 This has resulted in hundreds of
millions of users using their services.
When usability is sacrificed in favour of greater security –
see surespot or Alrawi (developed by extremists themselves) –
the uptake is less widespread and more concentrated among
extremist groups.21 But where encryption is supported by
usability, uptake is much more general. More than ever before,
social media technology facilitates untraceable conversations
between groups that are largely insulated from surveillance,
accountability and intervention.
The changing profile of extremism on social media
A number of changes in the practices of extremists online and
broader changes in the behaviour of the public on social media
have compounded the challenges presented to law enforcement
agencies and intelligence services by technological change.
Extremists are now more able to use social media to persuade
young people and support their transition to radical violence.
Social media themselves play a greater role in the formation of
our political, cultural and social beliefs, making confronting this
capacity more important than ever before.
In the face of this changing social media landscape,
traditional, rigidly legalistic, state-based responses to the security
challenges posed by this new social media world can only be part
of the fight against extremism online. Before new legal frame-
works are in place, their relevance is diminished. Before new
security powers are developed, or new demands placed on
platforms – and sometimes because they are – they are disrupted.
Consider the topic of oversight and safeguarding by social
media companies specifically. This approach has become central
to discussions of social media over the past few years. Pressure
on major social media platforms from governments concerned by
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what they host has driven some content into the fringes of the
internet, but censorship is technologically challenging and its
impact is minimal. A suspended user will re-emerge under a new
username.22 On Twitter, so-called Islamic State accounts use
‘swarmcasting’ to counter take-down attempts, exploiting a
combination of backup accounts, keyword and hashtag-based
networks and peer-to-peer signposting. Every extremist video
removed from YouTube is backed up in tens of unregulated
shadowy corners of the net, just a single click away.23 And while
companies like Twitter, Facebook and Google might be willing
to cooperate with government efforts to regulate online content,
other companies are not.24
The policing of social media content is not just technically
difficult, but also sometimes counter-productive. Attempts by the
state to regulate the online world can lead to a counter-reaction
from users. Edward Snowden’s revelations shook the security and
terrorist communities alike, and catalysed some much broader
changes in social media use. Pew research in the US suggested
that of the 87 per cent of Americans who had heard of the
Snowdon leaks concerning National Security Agency (NSA) 
and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
digital surveillance programmes, 34 per cent had taken at least
one step to hide or shield their information from the
government, for example by using social media less often or
uninstalling certain apps.25
Two factors influence extremists’ use of social media more
than anything else: trust and security.26 A range of factors can
influence levels of trust and security: the technology available,
patterns of offline communication, the actions of intelligence
and security services, and so on. These factors have led to
changes in extremists’ online behaviour over time.
Previously, state-based efforts to impair the activities of
extremists online have been successful. Before and after the 9/11
terrorist attacks, extremists communicated online with very little
restriction or disruption on the part of the security services – as a
result, Jihadi forums were often relatively open, few security
measures were thought necessary, and communication was
comparatively free and easy. A 2006 study, for example, found
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4,300 active Jihadist forums worldwide.27 As the War on Terror
progressed, intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies
worldwide stepped up their efforts to police the online space,
gather intelligence and disrupt extremist activities.28 The
viability of these sites decreased, and inter-extremist trust online
– particularly with regard to Islamist extremists – decreased,
inhibiting their online activities.29
Today, technological changes have led to this approach
being less effective. While Jihadi forums are largely inactive or
closed down, platforms such as WordPress and Tumblr host
hundreds of extremist blogs, Twitter and Facebook are host to
numerous extremist accounts, and platforms like WhatsApp, Kik
and Snapchat facilitate small-group communication.30 Among a
plethora of factors from technological advances to Jihadist
territorial acquisitions, extremists’ exploitation of mass-usage
social media platforms has become more viable. Over-stretched
intelligence and security agencies can monitor, shut down or
disrupt only a select number of the most important or dangerous
social media accounts – another driving force behind efforts to
push social media companies to undertake more substantive
safeguarding efforts.31
The result is that extremist content is currently both more
broadly available than before, and more often found on the same
large scale platforms used by the general public. Increasingly,
extremists – both far right and Islamist – operate with relative
impunity on a range of stable, mass-usage platforms, like Twitter,
Facebook and WhatsApp.
The threshold for accessing this material has also been
greatly reduced. This has led to what might be called ‘the
exposure effect’, where young people today are more likely to
stumble on, or more likely escalate their consumption of radical
material towards, violent extremist material.32 Most major
platforms now ‘auto-play’ video content without first asking the
user. Viewing a Hizb ut-Tahrir video on YouTube might bring up
a ‘recommended content’ video of a more extreme nature. A
search for a certain hashtag on Twitter might return tweets from
an Islamic State supporting account a user might not otherwise
have come into contact with.
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The nature of the material produced by extremists on these
platforms has changed too, with slick photo and video content
availing extremists of new opportunities to persuade and
manipulate young people online. In the past few years there has
been an explosion in the volume of photos, videos, podcasts and
even live-streaming media online.33 No group has exploited this
more effectively than Islamic State in the past few years, but
Demos research has found a similar strategy employed by far-
right groups on Facebook and Twitter.34 The contrast between
early al-Qaeda propaganda and the slick, relatable videos
released daily by Islamic State sympathisers in Syria, Iraq or
elsewhere is striking.35
Extremists seeking to persuade and recruit young people
online are now often digital natives themselves. The social media
savviness that brought Islamic State messages and videos onto
Western computers and mobile phones came as a surprise, but
was merely a product of a generation who have grown up with
these technologies. The new face of terror and extremism online
is at its core a simple result of young people who understand the
new tools and techniques available to them.
These specific changes in patterns of social media use by
extremists are taking place at a time when our outlooks on the
world – our social, cultural and political values, beliefs and
judgements – are more heavily shaped by online voices than 
ever before.36 Increasingly, people debate politics, participate 
in political activity, consume news and form peer-groups based
on shared interest on social media. These trends in turn 
increase the broader social risks posed by echo chambers – social
media networks and spaces where ideas of beliefs are reinforced
by expression and repetition in an environment devoid of
dissenting opinion.
One of the principal debates in the UK regarding the role
of social media in radicalisation has been whether individuals
can be radicalised online, or whether online content merely
sustains or catalyses radicalisation, or provides practical support
for those already persuaded by arguments for violent action.37
There has been some evidence that in cases where radicalisation
has had a significant online component, there is still very often
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an offline element.38 In a changing social media environment,
where it is easier than ever before for a vulnerable person to
come upon extremist content independently, there are
substantive reasons to re-examine the role that social media
content plays in radicalisation.39
Social media are not just used to persuade and recruit
young people into extremist groups – they are used to provide
them with the information required to support radical violence.
The current conflict in Iraq and Syria has enticed more Western
Muslims to become foreign fighters than any previous conflict,
and in a shorter period of time. While estimates vary, in many
European countries, social media have attracted more citizens
than all previous conflicts combined.40 An important driving
force behind this, beyond the relatively low risk of travel
compared with travel to previous conflicts in the region, is the
ease of access to information facilitating travel.41 Social media
can provide a would-be foreign fighter with information on the
best ways to reach Syria, what to bring and what to expect when
they get there.42 At the same time, accounts operated by fighters
and supporters in Syria – often drawing on their extended social
networks in their home country – can seek to persuade and
provide active support for those who might travel to join them.43
In this manner, social media can further reduce barriers to
potential foreign fighters considering travelling to Syria.
For all these reasons, extremism poses a growing threat to
our young people. This challenge has not yet been met
effectively.
Digital citizenship – a response to online extremism
While law enforcement agencies, security services and social
media companies all have roles to play in reducing the impact of
violent extremist material online, top down solutions such as
platform censorship and the banning of particular users can only
provide partial solutions to this problem.
Indeed, such a hard-edged approach to extremist content
might not be desirable from a civil liberties perspective. In recent
years, efforts to reduce the impact of extremist content online
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have focused on the increasingly rigorous application of laws
limiting what individuals can and cannot say. These laws
themselves have broadened to include additional categories of
speech – for example with the previous introduction of hate
speech laws in Europe through the EU’s 2008 Framework
Decision, and now an increasing reference to ‘dangerous speech’
or even ‘undesirable speech’.44 The extent to which these new
rafts of legislation are enforceable is debatable. Increasingly
restrictive laws on what a citizen can discuss could stop
important conversations about controversial or sensitive 
subjects – related to faith, politics and identity – being 
discussed in open digital spaces by individuals potentially
vulnerable to radicalisation.
If extremist content is entirely driven from mainstream
social media platforms, it might reduce the exposure of
vulnerable young people to extremist material. Yet it might also
drive extremist content and networks onto more obscure and
hidden platforms, away from authorities and individuals who
might otherwise be in a position to observe and counter this
content, and lend support to at-risk individuals.
Beyond the challenge of extremism, a range of other issues,
from hate speech to trolling and the sharing of sexual images
online, highlights the need to educate young people to be
responsible citizens online. People aged 16–24 in the UK spend
an average of 27 hours and 36 minutes a week on social media,
and find themselves confronted with an extraordinary array of
civic and ethical challenges.45 Social media have an enormous
impact on our culture as a whole. They define who we talk to,
and to an extent what we talk about. By channelling us towards
certain sources of information, they define what we read, hear or
watch. They have eroded the power of the traditional media
gatekeepers, with new media sources presenting information
without the filters of professional journalism. By enabling the
development of social networks based on shared interest and
characteristics, social media reduce the extent to which we
socialise with people unlike ourselves. Indeed, certain social
media phenomena which catalyse radicalisation also contribute
to wider polarisation in our political culture.
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Most social media users are, at some stage and to varying
degrees, part of an echo chamber – an insular conversation
within a group agreed on a single conclusion, not representative
of wider dialogues or exposed to dissenting views. An individual
might conclude from examining their Twitter feed that those in
their wider social group are in broad agreement on an issue when
that might not be the case. This misperception itself might drive
them towards more extreme positions on certain issues.
This phenomenon is further developed by ‘the filter
bubble’,46 where algorithms online present a personalised
selection of content to a user based on their location, past search
history and what they have interacted with in the past. For
example, on a Facebook feed, if an individual likes or comments
on certain types of post – say left-wing political articles – they
are likely to see more of this type of article in the future, and
fewer right-wing articles, isolating people from perspectives
different from their own. Social media algorithms designed to
present us with content that we like, based on our previous
choices, can reinforce this unhealthy siloing of opinion and
social groups. In this way, social media can make us more
efficient consumers, and less effective citizens.
That a person using social media every day might not even
in broad outline understand these fundamental mechanics is
problematic – in fact potentially dangerous. Young people in
particular should learn about these basic social media
phenomena, and should be taught those wider skills that have
become ever more important with the rise of social media – the
importance of fact-checking, for example, or the need to develop
opinions derived from a wide range of sources. The development
of these skills and an awareness of these considerations are
required not only to build their resilience to extremism but also
to make them effective citizens in the digital age. We often
assume that young people’s familiarity with this digital world
means that they do not require the guidance and development
the education system seeks to provide in the rest of our lives. We
are wrong.
Navigating these issues requires considered judgement,
based on informed guidance, yet the question of what constitutes
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good citizenship online is rarely addressed. Often skills related
to digital citizenship are covered as part of existing PSHE and
citizenship provision in UK schools, though more commonly the
emphasis is on safeguarding rather than more active citizenship.
As chapter 1 demonstrated, there are numerous digital
citizenship resources available to schools, but not many on the
particular skills required for building resilience to extremism.
What do you do if you are worried a friend’s opinions are
becoming more and more extreme? Can you retweet tweets
containing hate speech? What do you do if you see racist abuse
online? What is an echo chamber? How do social media sites
draw together the ‘recommended content’ they show you?
The answers to these kinds of questions are critically
important for young people to understand, for reasons that reach
beyond the Prevent agenda. It is often supposed that young
people understand technology and older people, such as teachers
and senior civil servants, do not. This conflates being digitally
engaged, or using technology, with being digitally literate, or
understanding how it works, and how it should be used
responsibly. In this area of citizenship, as in others, young
people need guidance and education.
The objectives of a digital citizenship education should
stretch beyond granting young people the knowledge they need
to understand how social media work, and seek to develop a
sense of online citizenship, an attitude that social media are not
just useful tools they use, but a digital space they inhabit, and
over which they should feel some responsibility. A consciousness
of the duties of the digital citizen, and of the unique power that
young people using social media today have, could have a range
of positive impacts in countering extremism.
Such an educational undertaking could, for example,
increase community engagement online, raising the number of
voices challenging extremist content online in a constructive 
way. It could increase the value and impact of peer-to-peer safe-
guarding, facilitate the increased reporting of online extremism
and hate speech, and lead to higher rates of referral of content,
accounts or individuals to law enforcement and security services.
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It is clear how digital citizenship could sit alongside other
interventions based on values-led themes of positive social
identity, counter-narratives and the appreciation of diversity. It
could reinforce the broader, basic skills that young people need
to be effective citizens in the 21st century. What is more, by
pursuing an approach based on the real and not rhetorical
empowering of young people, with new skills and
understanding, this kind of grassroots effort can flourish in a
space where the government is often not regarded as a credible
voice, and reduce the securitisation of the web.
In developing such a digital citizenship intervention
designed to increase the resilience of young people to 
extremist propaganda and manipulation, Demos seeks to 
address this challenge.
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3 Best practice review
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This chapter presents a rapid review of 12 existing digital
citizenship programmes, which highlights a number of
important gaps in the digital citizenship landscape, and confirms
that there is a lack of holistic digital citizenship resources with a
counter-extremism focus on which schools seeking to deliver
CVE interventions can draw.
It further presents an analysis of best practice in school-
based CVE and safeguarding intervention, conducted in order to
inform the design of the intervention. This analysis is based on
interviews with 11 key stakeholders and a review of nine higher
quality evaluations and meta-evaluations of comparable CVE
interventions from the US, the UK and Australia, predominantly
with an online element. It also examines the citizenship
curriculum in England and Wales, and the June 2015
Department for Education publication ‘The Prevent duty’,47
in order to ensure cohesion with both the wider educational
needs of schools and Department of Education guidance. The
review of these CVE and safeguarding evaluations provided
insights into how best to discuss sensitive social issues online 
in schools, deliver new skills and design an effective and
applicable intervention.
The evaluations reviewed were not just those related
directly to the online aspects of CVE, but school-delivered
interventions with related goals or characteristics. These
evaluations included:
· ‘Addressing radicalisation in the classroom’, an evaluation of the
Zak online radicalisation education tool48
· Evaluation of Internet Child Safety Materials Used by ICAC [Internet
Crimes Against Children] Task Forces in School and Community Settings
– a meta-analysis of reviews from 31 online intervention schemes
used in the US to tackle the internet aspects of a range of social
issues from drug use to gang violence49
· Teaching Approaches that Help to Build Resilience to Extremism Among
Young People – a case study review of ten extremism resilience
building interventions50
· ‘Jenny’s Story’: An internet safety resource developed to combat child
abuse on the internet – an evaluation of a UK-based, high profile
digital safeguarding intervention51
· Evaluation of CEOP ThinkUKnow Internet Safety Programme and
Exploration of Young People’s Internet Safety Knowledge – an
evaluation of a Child Exploitation and Online Protection
(CEOP) Centre intervention52
· The ACMA Cybersmart Outreach Program Evaluation – an evaluation
of an internet safety intervention for Australian Communications
and Media Authority 53
· Common Sense Media’s Digital Literacy and Citizenship Curriculum: A
Proven Success – an evaluation of Common Sense Media’s Digital
Literacy and Citizenship Curriculum54
· ‘Creating good digital citizens’ – an evaluation of the New South
Wales Government’s digital citizenship programme55
· Educational Evaluation of Cybersmart Detectives – an evaluation of
the Cybersmart detectives intervention, including a review of five
additional online safety programmes56
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While there has in recent years been an increase in the
focus on evidence in education policy, CVE-related interventions
have traditionally had less open evaluation processes, or been
subject to fewer evaluations of the type typical in other educa-
tional interventions – particularly in the UK. Consequently 
there is a relative paucity of high quality evaluative information
in this area. This is why it has been necessary in our review to
draw lessons from interventions conducted in other countries,
and to examine evaluations of programmes not directly related 
to extremism.
Even broadened out to other types of digital safety
evaluations, the level of evidence in this sector remains weak. As
one meta-evaluation put it ‘Overall, limited evidence has been
provided to date supporting the effectiveness of any cyber-safety
program and, in particular, the evidence base of the programs
currently available.’57
The expert interviews provided a broader range of
perspectives into school-delivered interventions. The 11
interviewees consulted as part of this project included national
and international security policy experts, social media platform
policy experts, local Prevent coordinators, civil servants and
academics. A number of these interviewees asked to speak on the
condition of anonymity, given the sensitivity of the subject
matter and in some cases their roles. No interviewees will be
identified in this report.
The best practice review made the following suggestions:
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· For longer-term impacts, interventions should focus on concrete
skills development rather than on general, ideological messaging.
· The objectives of the intervention should be clearly stated at the
beginning and articulated throughout.
· Discussions allowing the expression and exploration of social
and religious identities, and the promotion of positive social
narratives, are an important part of extremism-related
interventions.
· The delivery of interventions by external delivery staff is 
often a superior alternative to delivery by teachers. 
Deliverers should both be credible experts and understand 
the curriculum.
· The intervention should consider a broad range of types of
extremism, including Islamist and far right, to prevent particular
students feeling alienated.
· Young people respond well to leading the dialogue within the
intervention, and a dialogue-based rather than a didactic
approach is often more effective. This can be successfully
facilitated by role play.
· Content should be eye-opening, realistic and relevant to the
situation of the participants, and be presented with the
appropriate sensitivity.
· The delivery of the session should be tailored to differing
perspectives, attitudes and levels of knowledge within 
different groups.
· The impact an intervention seeks to achieve should be realistic,
limited and aligned with the time available in which to deliver
the programme.
· The intervention should be directly related to the needs of
schools and pupils, and for greatest effect tied into the broader
curriculum.
Existing resources
This section presents our rapid review of 12 high profile existing
digital citizenship resources, and highlights the gaps that exist in
the current digital citizenship landscape with regards to CVE
interventions in schools.
A number of educational organisations, social media
platforms and civil society groups have recognised the need to
teach digital citizenship skills in schools, and provided a range of
resources, from short interventions to multi-year, holistic
programmes. There are also a significant number of resources
that teach online safety, critical thinking and media literacy, in
combination with each other in a range of ways.
This rapid review examined 12 existing digital citizenship
interventions:
· the Common Sense Media digital citizenship programme58
· Digizen by ChildNet International (www.digizen.org/)
· the Digital Literacy & Citizenship programme from the South
West Grid for Learning59
· the digital citizenship resources produced by the New South
Wales government60
· Google and iKeepSafe’s Digital Literacy and Citizenship
Curriculum61
· Google’s independent digital citizenship resources62
· Netsmartz by the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children in the USA (www.netsmartz.org/Parents)
· InCtrl resources (www.teachinctrl.org/)
· resources gathered and presented by CyberWise
(www.cyberwise.org/)
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· resources gathered and presented by Digiteen
(https://digiteen.wikispaces.com/)
· the Digital Disruption resources previously developed by Bold
Creative (www.digitaldisruption.co.uk/)
· the guidance and resources provided by Parent Zone
(http://parentzone.org.uk/)
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Many of these resources can provide excellent foundations
for a 21st-century citizenship education. Recognising the range
of resources available teaching skills relevant to extremism, it is
important to reflect precisely on what gap in the market needs to
be filled.
A number of these resources provide some skills pertinent
to building resilience to extremism online. Some of the highest
quality programmes provide a holistic, multi-year package of
resources based on a structured framework built up from the
most basic digital skills to more sophisticated skills. In some
cases, these more holistic programmes do engage in some aspects
of critical thinking and media literacy. For example, one of these
programmes engages issues of critical media consumption,
encouraging young people to consume a wide range of sources.
Another addresses media literacy from another angle, exploring
the manipulation of digital images. Some programmes combine
some critical thinking or media literacy aspects with a discussion
of rights and responsibilities online. However, none of these
programmes focus on how to tackle extremism and radicalisation
online, and none of these resources draw together critical
thinking or media literacy skills, knowledge of how social media
change how we interact, and rights and responsibilities online.
The same gap exists in the resources designed by the social
media platforms themselves which, despite examining online
responsibilities and covering media literacy, do not examine
extremism or the persuasive forms it takes, directly or indirectly.
The US resources considered as part of this review focused
overwhelmingly on online safety, far less on citizenship, media
literacy and critical thinking, a common trait of older resources;
nor do they tackle extremism-related issues.
Some programmes do actively consider extremism, for
example through guidance and training relevant to Prevent – but
this is not couched in a digital citizenship context. One UK-
based programme provides detailed and sophisticated critical
thinking and media literacy education in an online context,
through a CVE-relevant approach, but without touching on
rights and responsibilities online. Another provides valuable
training and information on safeguarding, with guidance for
schools and teachers on fulfilling the digital safeguarding 
aspects of the Prevent duty, as well as information for parents 
on extremism and radicalisation, and critical thinking. 
However, they do not provide a package of resources for 
delivery to students which considers extremism or critical
thinking in that context.
In summary, currently a range of resources can support
digital citizenship education, but few address radicalisation or
extremism online, and none do so in the context of critical
thinking, media literacy and our online rights and responsi-
bilities. There are not yet resources which can be delivered in
classrooms and that deal effectively with the threat of extremism
in an online context and with a view to the Prevent duty.
Here we present the findings of our best practice review,
which are based on the assessment of evaluations and interviews,
through a thematic analysis.
Skills development
A common conclusion of the evaluations and reviews examined
in this study was that learning objectives should be clearly
signposted and communicated to participants. Participants
should be made aware, in any intervention, what the point of the
exercise is, and what they will gain from it, as noted in the
comments below:
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Several key features should be incorporated into any learning game, namely,
clearly signposting the key educational themes that are to be covered; the
game should allow young people to explore their own identities; the
simulation or tool should not patronise or flatter.63
The learning or wider objectives of participation should be communicated
clearly, along with how the activity in question fits within the broader
learning programme, or with other agenda.64
Implicit in this observation is that the intervention should
be based on the development of specific skills in the pursuit of
specific goals. One evaluation highlighted the need for clear
links between activities, skills and objectives:
We... urge stakeholders to define program logic clearly, by drawing an
explicit connection between the messages given, the skills that are expected 
to be learned, and how these behaviours will lead to improved safety and
well-being.65
A regular feature of less effective programmes is a lack of
concrete skills development, and a lack of research underpinning
the objectives of the programme. A lack of clear learning
objectives and of research-based messages were two of the four
key failures in online skill and safeguarding-related interventions
in the US identified in Evaluation of Internet Child Safety Materials
Used by ICAC [Internet Crimes Against Children] Task Forces in School
and Community Settings.66 This deduction is supported in Teaching
Approaches that Help to Build Resilience to Extremism Among Young
People, which concluded,
Interventions that include a focus on the ‘harder’ skills, tools and techniques
to improve personal resilience and aim to have real, long-lasting benefits,
such as leaving young people better able to cope with life pressures and
challenges, use critical thinking skills to appreciate different perspectives and
come to their own view, and work well with peers.67
Conversely, the mere conveyance of information, safety-
related messages or general statements is an insufficient 
objective of any intervention in schools on the subject of
extremism, because a lack of information alone is not the cause
of an inability to understand propaganda and manipulation
online, or of the vulnerability of young people to extremist
approaches online:
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The purpose of most of the activities and questions was to reinforce
educational messages. The assumption underlying this approach is that
youth suffer from a lack of knowledge – so the goals are to ply youth
information: ‘Bullying hurts’; ‘Using a sexual username is going to lead
people to think certain things about you’... However, we have made this
mistake before – thinking that the reason youth make bad decisions is
because they lack knowledge.68
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The interviewees we spoke to provided some insight into
what specific skills they thought should be taught. One local
Prevent coordinator suggested that too much value had
previously been placed on the teaching of values like tolerance
and respect, which – while laudable values to teach young
people – did not constitute hard skills. Generally, critical
thinking skills and knowledge of how social media change our
communications were regarded as important areas for online
resilience building. A social media policy expert felt that echo
chambers and a lack of consumption of diverse media sources
were a key part of online radicalisation and extremism online,
and contributed to wider social issues such as political
polarisation. Another suggested that teaching young people to
be aware of these social media phenomena, and how to adjust
their behaviour to compensate for them, could be a useful way of
undermining radicalisation online.
Another interviewee, a digital safeguarding expert,
suggested that the ability to evaluate arguments and evidence
online and apply critical thinking in a digital context was an
important skill which could increase young people’s resilience to
online propaganda. How to identify emotional manipulation –
the use of emotive hooks in argument in order to persuade
someone or motivate someone to action – was one specific skill
that was mentioned.
Identity
Evaluations of previous interventions have found that while the
teaching of specific, applicable skills is important, so are
discussions of identity. A number of interviewees suggested that
the encouragement of a positive social narrative, and positive
expressions of identity, should play an important part of an
intervention. Uncertainties around, conflicts within and the
pursuit of identities is an important part not just of the attraction
of extremist ideologies, but the attraction of other negative
groups such as criminal gangs. As one evaluation put it,
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Gangs and associations may do more than reinforce local territories and
provide group support. They may also help to determine identities and
change existing self-perceptions, especially where these associations are
separate from – and even at odds with – family and kinship networks...
Some of the ‘gangs’ we heard about had a more or less explicit ‘Muslim’
focus... Indeed, some young people appear to translate half-understood ideas
drawn from so-called radical Islamic or other extremist points of view, into a
justification for violence, and anti-social behaviour.69
One interviewee suggested that this creation of a positive
social narrative could not just be an expression of abstract
values, but that it had to create a distinct role for young people.
One interviewee proposed that participants should leave the
intervention with some sense of responsibility over their social
media networks to develop this.
More broadly, evaluations of previous interventions
suggested that discussions of identity can play an important part
in building resilience to extremist propaganda, which frequently
plays on identity conflict and insecurity:
A key aspect of building resilience is supporting young people to explore,
understand, and celebrate their personal identity. Particularly effective
seems to be enabling young people to reflect on the multiple facets of their
identity, discuss the possible tensions and celebrate multiplicity as something
which creates balance and ‘uniqueness’.70
Social media networks can play an important role in the
formation, exploration and expression of identity. One social
media policy expert suggested that discussions of how people
express and consolidate their identity online, and how this
identity can differ from their offline identity, should feature in
efforts to build young people’s resilience to extremism online.
Delivery
The delivery of successful interventions concerning sensitive
subjects – the question of who should teach the relevant skills
and facilitate the dialogue – is a complex problem. There are
advantages and disadvantages to different models of delivery,
and while teachers of course have teaching expertise and good
relationships with their students, the complexity of extremism
and related issues, as well as the understandable sensitivity of
teachers to discuss them, can be a barrier to effective delivery:
It goes without saying that this is a potentially complex and difficult area to
tackle either in groups or individually, by teachers who may not have any
prior in-depth knowledge or training on this topic.71
A number of interviewees highlighted this issue. One
digital safeguarding expert suggested that teachers can often be
unwilling to challenge opinions because of the difficulties
involved in navigating difficult cultural contexts. One
interviewee argued,
The willingness, confidence and ability of facilitators to act in such a way
that ‘connects’ with young people is crucial, as hard as this may be for the
classroom teacher... Facilitators must have sufficient knowledge to be able to,
for example, counter stereotypes or mistaken assumptions about a particular
religion, or where this is not feasible, know how to access the necessary
information.72
At the same time, precisely because of the pre-existing
relationships students have with teachers, the facilitation of these
kinds of sensitive discussions by teachers could leave participants
less willing to speak their minds. Police officers – traditionally a
major vehicle for safeguarding interventions – can also be
inappropriate facilitators:
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Law enforcement may not bring the most successful message or tone... Law
[enforcers], because of their experience and professional orientation, tend to
emphasize crime and danger, and punishment and sanctions. It is not clear
that these themes help to advance many of the skills and behavioural
changes that internet safety education is trying to achieve.73
More generally, the best delivery staff are also subject
experts and in a position to answer students’ follow-up questions
and related concerns. In some evaluations, a lack of teacher
subject knowledge led to a recommendation that the evaluation
should be provided by an external provider; the evaluators of
CEOP ThinkUKnow Internet Safety Programme believed the
subject knowledge of external deliverers to be a key benefit of an
intervention,74 as did those evaluating the ACMA Cybersmart
Outreach Program:
Presenter credibility contributed significantly to students’ receptiveness to the
ISAP [internet safety awareness presentation] information. Students,
teachers, and parents/carers recalled the presenters’ knowledge and passion
as highly influential and persuasive.75
Several interviewees suggested that compounding the need
for subject-specific credibility was the fact that many schools did
not yet have the necessary subject knowledge among staff
internally, because the relevant Prevent duties under the
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 had only just been
introduced. A digital safeguarding expert pointed out that for
those schools outside Prevent priority areas, particularly, the
delivery of this kind of intervention was often entirely novel.
External delivery is of course not the only solution –
interventions can involve continued professional development
that provides teachers with the necessary skills.76
The role of participants
The success or otherwise of interventions is defined not just by
the content or the delivery model, but by the nature of the
interaction between participants and facilitators.77 A number of
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interviewees, including education experts and local Prevent
coordinators, emphasised that interventions should involve
dialogue rather than pure information delivery, avoiding a
didactic approach. Discussions of subjects like extremism require
significant buy-in from participants in order to be constructive,
and a dialogue, where student contributions are solicited and
valued, can help establish this. Moreover, having students play
an active role in discussions can ensure that the skills taught by
an intervention can be contextualised through those students’
experiences, increasing the understanding that such skills are
relevant to them. One intervention commented,
Our findings suggest that critical thinking skills – crucial for interrogating
and challenging extremist ideologies – can be most successfully developed
through teaching methods that support inquiry and intellectual inquiry led
by the young people themselves.78
To an extent, this method supports a tailored approach to
the intervention, by allowing participants to dictate the pace of
the session:
Good pedagogy dictates that learners need to be actively engaged and that
learning needs to start from ‘where the learner is at’.79
These dialogues have to be well structured, and based on
strong ground rules that establish the parameters for a
conversation, ensure effective time on task, and reduce the risk of
unconstructive dialogue or conflict.80 As one interviewee pointed
out, this is particularly important in conversations about
extremism because of the sensitivity of the issue:
By sharing [the same rules and conventions] teachers can explore the 
young person’s understanding of what is and is not acceptable in terms of
behaviour and how they act, but also of how they should protect themselves.81
In some interventions, structure was provided by using
particular games, tasks or project-based group activities. In a
number of interventions role play has also been used to this end.
Best practice review 
One review of what makes interventions effective observed,
Those case studies which had an explicit focus on building personal
resilience used simple theoretical frameworks and interactive techniques
such as role-play to explore complex ideas about the control we can
exercise over our perceptions, emotions, behaviours, interaction with
others and capacity to affect change in our lives.82
Another evaluation similarly suggested that role play 
or other structured creative activities could perform this
positive role:
Youth also need a chance to discuss and practice the new protective skills
they are taught. The most established way for youth to practice is through
role-plays, although other creative activities can be designed that let
youth imagine when and how the skills could be applied and some of the
different outcomes.83
Focus of content and flexibility
The expert interviewees we spoke to were clear that in order
to achieve the best effect, interventions had to be sensitive to
how participants might react to controversial content. One
interviewee suggested that it was important to focus on
content more closely related to particular types of extremism
relevant to the area in which an intervention was delivered –
for example, focusing on Islamist extremism in areas where
those groups were most active, and on the far right in areas
where they were a particular problem. This could be achieved
by reasoning with students that this reflected which
communities were the victims of different types of extremist
exploitation. However, most interviewees suggested that a
balanced focus on a range of types of extremism was a better
approach, in order to prevent the alienation of people from
certain religious, ethnic or social groups.
One interviewee suggested that non-threatening specific
interventions should be used including a diverse range of
examples, purely because the skills required to build
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resilience to extremism are not largely threat specific, and future
threats might present a very different profile. This argument
dovetails into the wider discussion over whether to pursue a
CVE-specific approach, which deals specifically with extremism,
or a CVE-relevant approach, which conveys the right skills
without a significant focus on the issue of extremism.
The specific needs of particular participant groups, often
from diverse cultural, religious or socio-economic backgrounds,
necessitates flexibility in delivery. As one interviewee put it,
teachers are often keen to adapt these resources themselves, and
programme designers should be realistic about the
considerations, requirements and capacities of teachers.
However, this flexibility has to be tempered with the need for the
goals of an intervention to be achieved in full. One evaluation of
internet child safety materials noted,
Many of the program developers we talked with prided themselves on the
flexibility of their lesson plans – they openly encouraged schools and
presenters to pick and choose among the lessons, to adapt them, and to
implement as much or as little as they have time for. And our survey of law
enforcement presenters suggested that this was in fact happening. However,
this adaptability comes at a big cost if the effect is that the goals of improved
youth safety are compromised.84
Relevance of materials
One of the most important considerations in designing an
effective intervention is achieving the best balance between
approaching the subject matter with sensitivity, and ensuring
that the materials are relatable and hard-hitting enough to
engage participants and maintain their attention. Materials need
to be relevant to participants’ experiences:
Interventions work best where they are young person centred and young
person led. This means both having young people as peer educators, which
offers a sense of empowerment and can raise self-esteem, and making
materials and activities relevant to young people’s lives, for example, by
reflecting local community language and issues.85
Best practice review 
One evaluation suggested that the closer that scenarios or
educational games could be to the lived experiences of
participants, the more likely the skills taught in the intervention
would be applied:
Real-time interactions are more likely to closely mimic daily interactions
and this, in turn, can have important implications for the extent to which
messages become part of a student’s response repertoire.86
Indeed, the key criticism of one programme was that the
scenarios presented during the workshops that formed its core
were not realistic enough:
As young people are highly likely to interact with and sometimes meet
‘virtual friends’, this issue should be addressed with reference to ‘real
examples’ of anonymised vignettes where possible and videos should be more
realistic.87
In the subject area of extremism, the use of more realistic
scenarios is associated with a greater degree of ‘grittiness’, and
potentially uncomfortable language and subject matter. One
interviewee emphasised that getting this balance wrong could
significantly devalue a session. As one evaluation concluded,
A well-designed intervention often feels enjoyable to those participating and
[distinct] from normal classroom lessons. This can be achieved by building
in lots of opportunities for discussion and group exercises, the use of an
external facilitator rather than a classroom teacher, and taking an approach
that emphasises ‘honest realism’ – not shying away from controversial
details.88
One social media policy expert suggested that the social
content of an effective intervention needed to reflect accurately
not only the experiences of participants, but also the actual
content that young people produce on social media today – not
just text, but videos, annotated content, pictures, memes and
other types of rich media content.
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Length of intervention
Interventions should have limited and realistic objectives. A
number of interviewees pointed out that there is no single
perfect length or format for an intervention, not least because of
the paucity of evidence in this regard. However, as a general rule,
the more time spent studying a subject the better understood it
will be. The evaluation of the I-SAFE programme
reported a positive relationship between the number of hours the program
was implemented and the amount of knowledge gained; the more time that
was spent on the program the greater the extent of knowledge gained in
relation to general internet safety, predatory identification, managing risk
and sharing personal information. However, they did not provide an
indication of the level at which program implementation was deemed to 
be optimal.89
Whether it is a single workshop or a year-long programme,
the impact an intervention seeks to achieve should be aligned
with the time available in which to deliver it. Indeed, one of the
four key failures in online skill and safeguarding related
interventions in the US identified in Evaluation of Internet Child
Safety Materials Used by ICAC Task Forces in School and Community
Settings was a lack of sufficient time for learning:
Complex problems like peer harassment, risky sexual decisions, and
unhealthy romantic relationships (online or offline) require more time 
than one 45-minute lesson can offer to learn new ways of thinking 
about these problems and building skills that can improve healthy 
decision-making.90
More than one evaluation recommended the dedication of
more time to teach the materials than was included in the studied
intervention. The evaluation of Cybersmart Detectives by the
Child Health Promotion Research Centre trialled as a 90–120
minute session suggested that in future
consideration should be given to fitting the activity into a maximum of 
two periods, including time allowed for briefing and a plenary (say a
Best practice review 
maximum of 80–90 minutes online). Alternatively, restructuring for a
series of three 50min periods with one for briefing and one for the plenary
may be more acceptable.91
One interviewee suggested that the need to recognise these
limitations makes a further argument for skills-based
interventions rather than broad and holistic values-based efforts:
‘If someone has a deeply negative view, will that realistically be
changed in a workshop or two?’ Interventions that attempt to
provide a single solution to a problem as complex as resilience to
extremism are unlikely to succeed.
Curricular linkage
Some of the interventions that were evaluated as successful not
only delivered safeguarding outcomes around a specific issue,
but also fulfilled a range of other school requirements,
encouraging schools to engage in the programme. For example,
one intervention was evaluated particularly positively:
[It] meets the learning outcomes for PSHE or citizenship, as well as other
education criteria for key skills, such as: communication, information and
communication technology, working with others, improving own learning
and performance, and problem solving... also aptly meets the safeguarding
agenda and meets e-safety requirements set by Ofsted.92
Moreover, a number of educational experts interviewed
suggested that in order to have a coherent long-term effect, an
intervention should be tied into the wider curriculum. Bonnell et
al observed:
If an intervention or programme is to be sustainable, it needs to be linked
with and anchored in the wider curriculum. An intervention that is
integrated into curriculum structures and teachers’ working practices
increases its potential to have maximum impact for students. It also avoids
the necessity of spending time on one-off, isolated discrete interventions that
may need to be repeated at further cost in the future.93
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Beyond the requirements for schools to pursue counter-
radicalisation safeguarding and to support the Prevent
programme, as necessitated by the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act 2015, there is a range of other requirements that
extremism-related interventions can fulfil in a UK context. They
include the promotion of fundamental British values and the
spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils;
extremism-related interventions can easily be threaded into
PSHE delivery.
Additionally, extremism-related interventions can be
introduced as part of the citizenship curriculum. The
government’s guidance on the citizenship curriculum, Citizenship
programmes of study: key stages 3 and 4, touches on a number of key
themes of relevance.94 According to the government’s guidance
on citizenship, the purpose of citizenship is to provide pupils
with knowledge, skills and understanding to prepare them to
play a full and active part in society. As part of this, citizenship
should ‘equip pupils with the skills and knowledge to explore
political and social issues critically, to weigh evidence, debate
and make reasoned arguments’. The last two of the four general
aims of the citizenship curriculum are of particular relevance to
building resilience to extremism, and empowering students to
take action against it. Pupils should:
Best practice review 
· develop an interest in, and commitment to, participation in
volunteering as well as other forms of responsible activity, that
they will take with them into adulthood
· [be] equipped with the skills to think critically and debate
political questions
Much of the key stage 4 citizenship curriculum focuses on
critical thinking, how to make a positive contribution to society,
and the rights and responsibilities of citizens:
Teaching [at key stage 4] should build on the key stage 3 programme of study
to deepen pupils’ understanding of democracy, government and the rights
and responsibilities of citizens. Pupils should develop their skills to be able to
use a range of research strategies, weigh up evidence, make persuasive
arguments and substantiate their conclusions. They should experience and
evaluate different ways that citizens can act together to solve problems and
contribute to society.95
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These key themes, along with the need for community
cohesion, are reflected in two of the nine areas the key stage 4
citizenship curriculum recommends that pupils should be 
taught about:
· diverse national, regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United
Kingdom and the need for mutual respect and understanding
· the different ways in which a citizen can contribute to the improvement
of his or her community, to include the opportunity to participate
actively in community volunteering, as well as other forms of responsible
activity.96
Those delivering or designing extremism-related
programmes should make schools and teachers aware of these
links in order to promote those interventions more effectively
and to prevent unnecessary repetition within school delivery.

4 The intervention
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This chapter briefly describes the intervention piloted as part of
this project. It summarises the design process, describes the
resources developed for the intervention, explains the key
characteristics of the resources, and outlines the theory of change
underpinning the intervention as a whole.
The design process
This intervention, and the resources that sit at the heart of it,
were developed in partnership with the digital design con-
sultancy Bold Creative. Through its Digital Disruption initiative,
Bold Creative has been involved in creating and delivering
counter-extremism workshops for young people for a number of
years, producing resources – often in partnership with Demos –
for delivery in schools across the country. The initial design was
informed by our assessment of the changing social media
landscape and behaviour of extremists and terrorist groups,
including so-called Islamic State (see chapter 2); by the best
practice review presented in chapter 3; and by previous research
by Demos on social media behaviour and extremism online.
During the design phase, focus groups with teachers from a
range of schools and of a mix of seniorities and year 10 pupils
from diverse backgrounds allowed us to discuss the desired
characteristics and approach of the intervention, and to present
draft resources in order to solicit critical feedback. Expert
interviews with educational intervention experts, Prevent local
delivery officers, academics specialising in counter-extremism,
social media platform policy officers and civil servants also
informed the design process throughout.
The theory of change
Figure 1 outlines the theory of change around which this
intervention was based.
Figure 1 Digital citizenship pilot intervention
The intervention
Context
What’s the issue?
Terrorist organisations, such as so-called Islamic State (ISIS),
communicate with and recruit young people through social
media, which can play an important role in radicalisation.
Schools are vital in shaping each person to be an active,
engaged citizen; further, all schools are now subject to the
Prevent Duty and must work to prevent people from being
drawn into terrorism.
Understanding others’ perspectives, critical thinking and peer
support play an important role in building resilience to
radicalisation.
There is a poor understanding of what constitutes good
citizenship online; there are few digital citizenship resources,
and young people are rarely taught digital citizenship. 
Inputs
What do we need to achieve our goals? 
Project team: 
Demos and Bold Creative.
Time frame:
January 2016 to May 2016 (five months).
Place:
Four secondary schools in England.
Delivery staff: 
Four staff from Demos and Bold Creative.
Partners: 
Schools, expert interviewees, and networks (PSHE Association,
TES).
Resources:
Funding for research, development, piloting and evaluation,
incentives for schools, resources, teacher guidance and
capacity to deliver. 
Activities
What do we have to do to ensure our goals are met?
Design resources to develop digital citizenship, critical thinking
skills and knowledge of social media phenomena based on a
review of existing evidence and practice.
Pilot workshops in four schools over the course of two weeks
in March 2016.
Evaluate project success using pre- and post-surveys (vs
comparison group) and staff and student interviews.
Publish resources on standalone website and promote through
TES and PSHE Association; develop commercial market for
workshops.
Outputs
Figure 1 Digital citizenship pilot intervention – continued
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Outputs
Participation
Who needs to:
– participate?
– be involved?
– be reached?
Schools: 
Four secondary schools in England.
Students:
Approximately 100 participants in four schools; 14–15-year-olds
(year 10, key stage 4). 
Materials will be suitable for students with special educational
needs and other additional needs (eg English as an additional
language) in school.
Outcomes
Learning
What do we think the participants will know, feel or be able
to do after participating in the programme?
Participants will demonstrate better understanding of online
propaganda techniques, and will be able to analyse information
on social media more critically. 
They will learn how to practise good citizenship online, and will
understand how social media affect our communications.
They will be less likely to be drawn in by extremist narratives
and arguments, and feel more responsibility for their peers
online.
Action
How do we think the participants will behave or act
differently after participating in the programme?
Participants will be less likely to undertake risky behaviours
online, or engage with extremist or illegal material. 
They will be less likely to be inclined towards extremist speech
or action.
They will be more likely to act positively to confront or remove
extremist or hate speech material online, and to safeguard
their peers. 
Impacts
What kind of impact can result if participants behave or act
differently after participating in the programme?
Young people will be better able to understand others’
perspectives and think critically online, becoming better online
citizens and less sympathetic towards extremist viewpoints.
Teachers will be able to use the resources and materials for
workshops and be better equipped to tackle these issues.
Fewer young people will be taken in and radicalised by online
propaganda. 
The resources
The resources created by Demos and Bold Creative were based
on an interactive digital presentation deck, which presented
anonymised, real-life instances of extremist propaganda and
dialogue on a range of social media platforms. These
conversations included video and rich media content, and were
designed around an options menu allowing facilitators to choose
the subject focus of the intervention – from far-right extremism
to homophobia, from anti-Semitism to Islamist extremism. The
facilitator dictates the pace at which these scenarios unfold,
providing opportunities for participants to contribute comments
and responses, and for facilitators to explore particular aspects of
the conversations, and to use those conversations to explore key
terms and concepts, for example ‘echo chambers’ (figure 2).
This presentation deck also explains key terms and
concepts that can be referred to at any point during the
conversations through a series of sidebar menus. These sit
alongside the scenarios, and include interactive elements – such
as a ‘hate-o-meter’ scale explaining hate speech and free speech
(figure 3) – and professionally produced illustrations describing
key concepts, such as us & them narratives and echo chambers.
The intervention
Figure 2 An illustration of echo chambers, a key concept in the
intervention
This presentation deck forms the core resources around
which the intervention is based. This deck is supplemented with
a range of other materials, including professionally produced A3
print out cards illustrating an extremist conversation online
(figure 4), and blank cards allowing participants to involve
themselves in the conversation and apply the skills they have
learned. We also produced workshop plans, teacher guidance
and a glossary of key terms in order to help teachers deliver the
resources in the absence of external delivery assistance.
The delivery model
These resources were delivered through two one-hour long
workshops, during PSHE, RE or citizenship lesson time. They
were delivered on the same day each week for a two week period.
The first workshop focused predominantly on critical
thinking and the recognition of online propaganda, based
around the explanation of and discussions centred on ‘the three
methods of manipulation’ online: us & them narratives,
scapegoating and emotional manipulation. The second
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Figure 3 The hate-o-meter, part of the digital resource
workshop focused predominantly on digital citizenship and
peer-to-peer safeguarding; it centred on an explanation of and
exercises related to ‘the three principles of digital savviness’:
emotional intelligence, digital farming and comm-unity.
Both workshops involved the delivery of certain elements
of knowledge related to specific social media phenomena and
how social media change how we communicate online. These
elements were focused on the concepts of the ‘echo chamber’
and the ‘keyboard warrior’.
While teachers were also present to manage behaviour, two
facilitators delivered each workshop – one Bold Creative
workshop delivery specialist, who facilitated the session, and one
Demos researcher, who provided expert knowledge and
answered participants’ questions on specific details. However,
the workshops were designed potentially to be delivered
internally by teachers and teaching assistants.
Each session examined key concepts, terms and the
scenarios themselves, and was delivered in a relaxed way, with
participants leading the dialogue and contributing to the
The intervention
Figure 4 One of the interactive conversation threads used to
demonstrate online extremism, in this case grooming
undertaken by an ISIS recruiter
scenarios with comments and observations. There was a focus on
group work, both as a whole class and in small groups. Each
session began with an explanation of the objectives of the
sessions and the skills that would be gained, and ended with a
review of key terms and skills.
The key characteristics of the resources
Following our preliminary research, best practice review and
expert consultation, the intervention was designed with a range
of specific characteristics and features in mind.
It was intended to convey a positive social narrative to the
participants – that they were in a position of power on social
media, and that they had to take a lead in identifying and
arguing against extremism and hate speech online, and in
gaining peer-to-peer support. This was in order to incubate
positive changes in how participants actually behave online.
The intervention also focused on developing specific skills
such as enabling participants to recognise propaganda and poor
arguments, and to develop critical thinking and specific
knowledge of the different ways in which social media change
the way in which we communicate online.
The resources were based on a number of anonymised real-
life examples of social media conversations on a range of
platforms, which involved various types of hate speech and
extremism, in order to make the material more engaging for
participants.
The intervention was designed in a modular manner in
order to increase flexibility in delivery. The resources provided a
range of social media situations on a number of topics – from
homophobia to anti-Semitism, from far-right extremism to
Islamic State – all of which contained contributions pertinent to
the skills development objectives of the intervention. This means
that delivery staff and teachers can choose the particular
situations to focus on, depending on the needs of the
participants and other considerations, and can choose to pursue
either a CVE-relevant or a CVE-specific approach, according to
their preference.
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The resources were created to facilitate participant-led
dialogue rather than the presentation of information. This
invests participants in the intervention, and allows them to relate
it to their own situation and to dictate the focus of delivery.
The needs of schools were at the forefront of the
conception of the intervention, which was designed to tie into
the delivery of the PSHE and citizenship curriculums, as well as
British values delivery, and social moral spiritual and cultural
development.
This intervention was intended first and foremost to be
delivered by external deliverers – Demos researchers and Bold
Creative school workshop specialists. However, teacher guidance
documents were also produced to allow teachers to deliver the
resources in future.
The intervention
5 Evaluation
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This chapter presents the impact and process evaluation of the
experimental pilot in which we delivered the intervention.
The impact evaluation included qualitative and
quantitative elements, consisting of pre- and post-surveys of the
participant classes in each of the four schools involved, and of a
comparison group in each school. These surveys examined
confidence and knowledge in areas directly related to the
objectives of the intervention, and assessed the experience of the
workshops in the participant group post-surveys. These surveys
also presented a series of four online civic judgement scenarios
related to hate speech and extremism, each of which described a
situation, and asked respondents to choose from a range of
options how they would respond to it and why.
This impact evaluation was accompanied by a process
evaluation, which included: process-related questions in the
participant post-survey; four focus groups with participants in
the workshops, one from each class, each consisting of five or six
pupils, examining the experience of the participants in the
workshops; and four interviews with classroom teachers
observing the delivery of the workshops, examining the
pedagogical aspects of the delivery, and the utility of the
workshops from the perspective of teachers.
Here we describe the key findings of the evaluation.
Key findings: impact evaluation
There were positive impacts across a range of key measures:
· There was a statistically significant (12 per cent) increase in
participants’ confidence that they understand what techniques
are used to manipulate people on social media, compared with
no statistically significant increase (3 per cent) in the comparison
group.
· Over the course of the programme, there was a statistically
significant (10 per cent) increase in participants’ confidence that
they could distinguish between truth and lies on social media,
compared with no statistically significant increase (5 per cent) in
the comparison group.
· There was a statistically significant (10 per cent) increase in
participants’ confidence that they would know what to do if
confronted with hate speech online, compared with a statistically
insignificant decrease (–4 per cent) in the comparison group.
· Statistically, the intervention significantly increased participants’
understanding of key terms associated with online discourse –
particularly ‘echo chamber’ and ‘keyboard warrior’.
· There was an increase of 10 per cent in the level of participant
confidence that they could confront extremist opinions online,
though this increase was not statistically significant.
· The intervention did not make participants more or less
comfortable socialising with people from different backgrounds
from them. However, this question was the one area in which a
statistically significant change (of 3 per cent) was observable in
the comparison group.
· Both the surveys and focus groups showed that participants
overwhelmingly felt they had gained knowledge and new skills
from the workshops: 89 per cent responded that they had
learned or learned lots of new skills and knowledge, and 94 per
cent of participants reported that they understood some or all of
the content by the end of the workshops.
· The analysis of the civic judgement scenarios in the pre- and
post-surveys suggests that the intervention made participants
more likely to report extremist material or hate speech online to
the police, and less likely to take actions that purely benefit
themselves. Participants were also less likely to justify their
actions on emotional or selfish grounds, and more likely to
justify their actions through more constructive, solution-
orientated reasoning.
Evaluation
Key findings: process evaluation
The process evaluation returned positive results across all
measures, and the qualitative data attested to the efficacy of 
the programme, while also providing feedback for future
improvements:
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· Participants largely thought that the content of the intervention
was relevant to them, with 77 per cent of them finding the
workshops quite or highly relevant.
· Participants also overwhelmingly enjoyed the workshops: 80 per
cent of them liked the workshops or liked them a lot.
· Participants almost entirely found the workshops were age
appropriate for them, with 92 per cent suggesting the workshops
were pitched at the right age; 3 per cent felt they were more
appropriate for older students, 3 per cent thought they were
more appropriate for younger students.
Key findings: evaluation method
The quantitative evaluation was based primarily on pre- and
post-surveys of the participants in the four classes who
undertook the workshops, and surveying an equal number of
comparison classes. Participants in each of the comparison
classes came from the same school and year as each of the four
participant classes by the school, selected into groups by school
staff. The pre-surveys were delivered a week before the first
workshop, and the post-surveys a week after the final workshop,
though following the rescheduling of a class in one school the
post-survey was delivered a week late. In total, 165 students were
surveyed – 75 pupils in the participant groups and 90 in the
comparison groups. Further details on our evaluation method
can be found in the technical appendix to this report.
In reflecting on the quantitative results, it is important to
note that this experimental pilot evaluation operated on a
comparison group design with a sample of four schools. Given
the lack of randomisation and the small sample size, although it
is possible to derive statistical significance for large changes, it is
more difficult to draw wider conclusions about the effectiveness
of the intervention as may be possible with an enhanced sample
size and randomisation (eg an RCT-type model). The evaluation
therefore approaches level 3 on Nesta’s standards of evidence,
whereby it is possible to attribute some causality to the interven-
tion, albeit the evidence could be strengthened by introducing
randomisation and increasing the number of participants.97
This quantitative research was supplemented with
qualitative research, which focused mainly on the experience and
process of the intervention, but also examined the extent to
which the young people involved and their teachers felt that they
had gained new and relevant skills. There were two elements of
qualitative research. Interviews were conducted after the final
workshop had been delivered with the class teachers in charge of
each of the participant classes in the four schools. These 30
minute interviews covered the delivery of the workshops, the
pedagogical observations of the teachers and the teachers’ review
of the suitability and value of the material. Demos researchers
also conducted four focus groups of between 30 and 45 minutes,
one in each of the participant classes, after the final workshop.
These focus groups centred on the experience of the
participating students, how relevant they felt the material was to
their lives, and their review of the resources and approach taken
in their delivery.
This review of the qualitative and quantitative research is
presented below in two parts: the impact evaluation and the
process evaluation.
Impact evaluation
The intervention sought to achieve positive impacts in three
specific areas of digital citizenship:
Evaluation
· the development of critical thinking skills
· the development of critical social media consumption skills
· the development of peer safeguarding skills and online
responsibility
These goals defined the structure of the intervention as well
as the evaluation of its impact, which was based on participants’
levels of agreement with nine statements, supplemented by
participant focus groups and class teacher interviews following
the intervention.
Across five of the nine impact-measuring statements and in
all three of these impact areas, a number of statistically
significant impacts were achieved. Qualitative research
supported these impact assessments.
Critical thinking
The intervention sought to develop the critical thinking abilities
of participants, in particular to recognise and critically evaluate
manipulation and poor argument used online. It attempted to
enable participants to understand how extremists manipulate
people on social media, and to distinguish between poor
arguments and high quality arguments in that context. This is
best expressed as the ability to distinguish between truth and lies
on social media.
Developing critical thinking skills was the focus of the first
workshop, though they were reviewed in the second workshop.
The impact of this element of the programme was analysed by
assessing in pre- and post-surveys participants’ levels of
agreement with the following statements:
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I am confident I know how to differentiate between truth and lies on 
social media.
I understand what techniques are used to manipulate people on 
social media.
Figure 5 shows the two confidence statements related
specifically to critical thinking, and reveals there was a
statistically significant positive change between the pre- and
post-survey results of the participant group on two key measures.
There was a 10 per cent increase in the level of agreement with
the statement ‘I am confident that I can distinguish between
truth and lies on social media’, with the average response on a
seven-point Likert scale (from strongly agree at 7 to strongly
disagree at 1) changing from 5.2 to 5.8 out of 7. In the
comparison group, there was a positive variation, though this
small positive change was not significant.
There was a larger statistically significant positive change
between the pre- and post-survey results of the participant group
with regards to the level of agreement with the statement, ‘I
understand what techniques are used to manipulate people on
social media.’ The average level of agreement with this statement
rose from 5.0 to 5.7 out of 7. In the comparison group, there was
again a non-significant positive variation.
The positive effects observed in the surveys were mirrored
in focus groups. When asked whether they might apply what
they had learned about critical thinking, propaganda and
manipulation in their everyday use of social media, participants
commonly suggested either that they might well, that they
would, or that they already had done so since the end of the
workshops:
I can like, when I go online, I can sort of analyse how people are
commenting, and what manipulation they are using, how they can
persuade you.
I know what they’re doing.
I can [read an extreme argument] and think back to how we read it in
school.
I look at people writing that kind of stuff online, and now I know what
they are doing.
Social media interaction
The intervention sought to develop in participants a knowledge
of how social media change how people interact online, and
what technological and social factors online influence the way
people communicate and consume information, in order to allow
them to contextualise and better understand extremism and hate
speech online. This was achieved by discussing a number of
Evaluation
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Figure 5 The extent to which participants’ level of agreement with
two statements on critical thinking changed after the inter-
vention (participants n = 75, comparison group n = 90)
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online concepts, including anonymity and the selective
consumption of media content (see chapter 1). The two principal
social media phenomena discussed were:
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· the online disinhibition effect, simplified to the term ‘keyboard
warrior’, where the nature of digital communications (reduced
empathetic communication, reduced social cues, in some cases
anonymity, and so on) change how people interact
· ‘echo chamber’, where small groups lacking dissenting opinion
gravitate towards a more extreme position through mutual
reinforcement
This understanding was developed in both workshops.
The impact of this element of the programme was analysed by
assessing in pre- and post-surveys participants’ levels of
agreement with the following statements:
I understand what an echo chamber is.
I understand what a keyboard warrior is.
I actively seek out and understand viewpoints that differ from my own.
Figure 6 shows the extent to which participants understood
what the two key terms meant before and after the workshops. In
both cases, there were significant positive changes in the level of
knowledge confidence of participants, which was as expected,
because ‘keyboard warriors’ and ‘echo chambers’ were concepts
participants were unlikely to have come into contact with
previously. Participants were likely to have their own colloquial
knowledge of what keyboard warriors might refer to.
There was a significant positive change in the level of
agreement with the statement ‘I understand what an echo
chamber is’ between the pre- and post-survey responses of the
participant group, with the average response to this statement 
on a seven-point Likert scale (from strongly agree at 7 to 
strongly disagree at 1) rising from 1.8 to 5.3. In the comparison
group, there was again a non-significant positive variation.
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Figure 6 The extent to which participants understood what an
‘echo chamber’ and a ‘keyboard warrior’ are after both
workshops (participant group n = 75, comparison group 
n = 90)
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Similarly, there was a significant positive change in the level of
agreement with the statement ‘I understand what being a
keyboard warrior is’, with knowledge of this term rising from a
higher baseline of 4.1 to 6.1 between the pre- and post-survey.
Again, in the comparison group, there was a non-significant
positive variation.
There was no significant change to the level of agreement
with the third and more general statement, ‘I actively seek out
and understand viewpoints that differ from my own’: a 3 per 
cent positive change in the participant group, too small to 
be significant, and a –1 per cent negative change in the
comparison group.
Responsibilities and peer safeguarding
The intervention also sought to increase participants’ sense of
responsibility over their peers online, and their confidence in
responding to or otherwise dealing with hate speech and
extremism online. This was achieved by discussing the
importance of digital citizenship, and considering a series of
participatory scenarios, examining the options participants have
when confronted with similar situations and what considerations
they might take into account.
Enhancing these abilities was the focus of the second
workshop, and touched on in the first workshop. The impact of
this element of the programme was analysed during focus groups
with participants and interviews with class teachers, and by
assessing in pre-and post-surveys participants’ levels of
agreement with the following statements:
Evaluation
I would know what to do if I’m confronted with hate speech online.
I am confident that I could challenge extremist opinions online.
When I post, share, or distribute messages online, I think about how they
might affect other people.
I understand what behaving well online consists of.
Figure 7 shows the two confidence statements related
specifically to hate speech and extremism, and shows positive
change between the pre- and post-survey results of the
participant group on two key measures, though only one of these
changes is found to be statistically significant. There was a 10 per
cent increase in the level of agreement with the statement ‘I am
confident that I could challenge extremist opinions online’, but
this change was not significant. The average response to this
statement on a seven-point Likert scale (from strongly agree 
at 7 to strongly disagree at 1) changed from 4.4 to 4.9 out of 7. In
the comparison group, there was a non-significant positive
variation.
There was a larger, statistically significant positive change
between the pre- and post-survey results of the participant group
with regards to the level of agreement with the statement, ‘I
would know what to do if I’m confronted with hate speech
online.’ The average level of agreement with this statement 
rose from 5.1 to 5.6 out of 7, a statistically significant positive
change. In the comparison group, there was a non-significant
negative variation.
The focus groups reinforced the idea that the workshops
had helped the participants develop the ability to understand
and react effectively to hate speech and extremism online.
Generally, participants were positive about the skills they had
learned in this area during the workshops, and related them back
to their actual social media use, commenting:
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I now understand how to react and what to do in those kind of online
situations.
[We’ll be more careful about] what you read and what you write. So when you
write you’ll think not to use us and them for example, and when you read
things you’ll know when it’s hate speech.
Yeah, seeing the replies on the cards [in the second workshop], I think I’d
definitely think about it before doing it.
Evaluation
Figure 7 Changes in participants’ level of agreement with two
statements on digital citizenship after the second
workshop (participant n = 75, comparison n = 90)
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There was however no significant change in the level of
agreement with the statement, ‘I understand what behaving well
online consists of.’ In both groups, the average level of
agreement was very high in the pre-survey – 6.25 and 6.23 out of
7 in the participant and comparison groups respectively, leaving
little room for positive change – and this score was largely
unchanged as a result of the intervention, with a 0 per cent
change in the participant group, and a 1 per cent positive change
in the comparison group.
There was also no significant change in the level of
agreement with the statement, ‘When I post, share or distribute
messages online, I think about how they might affect other
people.’ There was a –3 per cent negative change in the
participant group, a change too small to be significant, and a 6
per cent positive change in the comparison group, from a
baseline of 5.45 dropping to 5.30 for the participant group, and
of 5.36 rising to 5.66 for the comparison group (see figure 8).
Knowledge gain and key terms recall
Beyond the key impact measures explained above, the post-
survey undertaken by the participants, and the focus groups 
with participants and interviews with classroom teachers,
provided insights into the extent to which teachers and partici-
pants felt that new skills and knowledge had been conveyed and
understood by the students through participating in the
workshops.
Participants overwhelmingly agreed they had learned new
skills and gained knowledge from the workshops, and that they
had understood some or all of the subject matter conveyed. A
very high proportion said they understood some or all of the
content of the workshops by the end of the programme.
When asked ‘Do you feel like you learned new skills or
gained knowledge from the workshops?’, 89 per cent of
respondents replied either ‘yes’ or ‘yes, lots’, while only 9 per
cent responded ‘no’ or ‘no not at all’ (figure 9).
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Figure 8 Changes in participants’ level of agreement with
statement ‘When I post, share, or distribute messages
online, I think about how they might affect other people’
after the second workshop (participant n = 75,
comparison n = 90)
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Figure 9 The extent to which participants agreed with the
question ‘Do you feel like you learned new skills or
gained knowledge from the workshops?’ (n = 65)
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As well as feeling that they had gained new skills or
knowledge, participants also thought they had understood the
subject matter by the end of the workshops. Nearly all the
participants (94 per cent) said they understood some or all of the
subject matter by the end of the workshop, with only 3 per cent
saying they understood little, and no respondents answering that
they understood nothing (figure 10).
Generally, teachers were also positive about the skills that
the participants took away from the workshops. One teacher
observed that the students had started using the key terms used
in the workshops in other classes, and that they were feeding the
themes from the workshops into other courses:
Evaluation
Overall I think it’s been a positive thing for students. We can feed this back
into their course work, and the work we do about radicalisation. In fact
they’ve been using those key words in some of their lessons now. It’s helped
me too, because I’d never come across [for example] echo chambers... I’m
using those terms myself in other lessons as well.
The participant survey asked respondents to recall terms
they had used in the workshops. These were the three key terms
associated with the first workshop – The Methods of Manipula-
tion: scapegoating, us & them narratives and emotional
manipulation – and the three key terms associated with the
second workshop – The Principles of Digital Savviness: digital
farming, emotional intelligence and comm-unity.
The ability of participants to recall these terms is not of
particular importance: the terms were invented and used to
signpost observations and discussions, and without a
comparative pre-survey measure, change cannot be observed.
However, the extent to which participants can recall terms
associated with these two workshops provides a measure of the
relative impact of the subject matter of those workshops.
The levels of recall for the first workshop’s key terms were
higher than those for the second (figure 11). This reflects the fact
that the second workshop sought to convey more information
that the first, while also revising the material covered in the
second session. Consideration might be given to revising the
digital citizenship terms in future workshops.
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Figure 10 The extent to which participants agreed with the
question ‘Do you feel like you understood the subject
matter by the end of the workshops?’ (n = 65)
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Figure 11 The extent to which participants recalled key terms after
the workshops (n = 67)
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Civic judgement scenarios
The analysis of the civic judgement scenario aspects of the pre- and
post-surveys provided insight into how the intervention might have
changed participants’ attitudes and choices. Their responses to
these scenarios suggested that after participating in the project
participants would be more likely to report extremist material or
hate speech online to the police, and less likely to take actions that
purely benefit themselves. More profoundly, participants were less
likely to justify their actions on emotional or selfish grounds, and
more likely to justify them by giving constructive, solution-
orientated reasons.
The pre- and post-surveys presented participants and
comparison group members with a series of four online civic
judgement scenarios. For each one, respondents were asked to
choose from a list of 11 potential actions, including options like ‘I
would block or unfriend them’, ‘I would try to discuss why they
felt that way with them’, ‘I would report it to the police’ or ‘I
wouldn’t do anything’. They were then asked to choose a
justification for this decision, again from a list of 11 potential
options, including ‘I would want the authorities to get involved’, ‘I
would want to discourage them from doing it again’ and ‘I
wouldn’t want to tell them what to think’. The scenarios themselves
reflected a range of possible online encounters related to free
speech, hate speech and extremism (figure 12).
These scenarios present a varied range of situations for which
differing actions might be appropriate. Demos researchers grouped
the responses to these scenarios together, in order to identify
patterns within a larger sample of responses and examine net
changes in responses between pre- and post-surveys.
In the analysis of the actions and justifications, researchers
examined changes in the responses in two ways. First we examined
changes to the individual action and justification option choices
made by comparison and participant groups between the pre- and
post-survey. Second we grouped action and justification responses
thematically into four categories by types of responses chosen.
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These were the categories for the action responses:
· individual action: actions that involve direct interaction
between the respondent and the subject, either to persuade or
dismiss them, including ‘I would try to discuss why they felt
that way with them’ and ‘I would block or unfriend them’
· negative action: actions broadly categorisable as a poor choice
in any of the four scenarios, including ‘I would insult them’
and ‘I would share what they said more widely to shame them’
· recourse to authority: actions that draw in the involvement of
third parties, including ‘I would report it to the social media
platform I was using’ or ‘I would report it to the police’
· inaction: actions that involve a lack of action, including ‘I
wouldn’t do anything’ and ‘I would ignore it/them’
Evaluation
Figure 12 Civic judgement scenarios used in pre-and post-surveys
Scenario 1
You are messaging in a group with some friends, when someone
expresses a racist opinion about one of your classmates.
Scenario 2
You write a social media post arguing for a cause you believe 
in. Someone comments on it, aggressively disagreeing with 
your opinion.
Scenario 3
Someone from another year group in your school posts a 
couple of social media statuses arguing for violence against 
an ethnic or religious group. 
Scenario 4
Someone you don’t really know shares a video on social 
media encouraging violent rioting in the UK, and tags 
you in it.
These were the categories for the justification responses:
· passive: justifications for a lack of action or not getting involved,
including ‘I wouldn’t want to tell them what to think’ and ‘It
wouldn’t really bother me’
· uninformed: justification choices that indicate uncertainty or
confusion, including ‘I don’t know why’ and ‘I don’t know what
I’d do’
· active: justification choices that indicate a desire for action,
without involving a third party, including ‘It would make me
upset or angry’ and ‘I would want to discourage them from
doing it again’
· escalation: justification choices that indicate a desire for action
involving a third party, including ‘I would want to get advice on
what to do’ and ‘I would want the authorities to get involved’
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The most significant of the changes in individual choices,
demonstrating thematic trends through the lens of the categories
described above, are discussed below.
There were two significant individual choice changes in 
the participant group between the pre- and post-surveys. No
similar changes were observed in the comparison group for
either of them.
Before the intervention, choosing the option ‘I would block
or unfriend them’ was common, a choice made by 21 per cent of
respondents (see figure 13). After the intervention, the option ‘I
would block or unfriend them’ was chosen only 13 per cent of the
time, a 38 per cent decline. The number of participants choosing
the option ‘I would report it to the social media platform I was
using’ increased from 7 per cent to 13 per cent of all action
responses, an 86 per cent increase.
This change reflects a willingness among participants to
take actions with a greater consideration of other social media
users and their wellbeing – blocking a user makes them invisible
to that individual user, and reporting someone to a social media
company can lead to more significant action against that user.
Key objectives of the workshops were to encourage participants
to report hate speech and extreme propaganda to social media
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Figure 13 How participants’ choices of two options in civic
judgement scenarios changed following the intervention
(participant group n = 96 pre-survey, 73 post-survey;
comparison group n = 105 pre-survey, 88 post-survey)
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networks, or in more extreme cases to the police, and promote a
greater sense of collective responsibility for their social networks.
These specific changes to the types of action participants
were prepared to take were reflected in the general trend of their
responses within the thematic categories of action covered in the
civic judgement scenarios. Individual actions reduced from 51
per cent to 44 per cent of responses, and actions where a
participant would seek help from authority increased from 16 per
cent to 25 per cent of all responses. As a result of the intervention
participants were more willing to report people involved in
extremism or hate speech to social media platforms – policing
their social media networks – or to contact the police, though
this change was less substantial (figure 14).
These changes of participants to action choices reflected
the influence of the workshops in a number of degrees. The most
radical changes, however, were in the justifications young people
made for their action choices
There was a notable decline in the number of respondents
citing less considered or less rational justifications for action. For
example, the proportion choosing actions that were based on
emotion – ‘It would make me upset or angry’ – declined from 14
per cent to 10 per cent, while the use of more selfish or casual
justifications also declined, with the proportion choosing ‘It
wouldn’t really bother me’ declining from 12 per cent to 9 per
cent, and the proportion choosing ‘I wouldn’t want to speak to
them’ declining from 17 per cent to 13 per cent.
Conversely, there was an increase in the number of more
constructive, solution-orientated justifications for action (figure
15). The proportion of actions justified through the statement ‘I
would want to persuade them to think differently’ increased from
12 per cent to 16 per cent, while the proportion of responses
justified through a desire to escalate the problem to the relevant
authorities, ‘I would want the authorities involved’, doubled
from 5 per cent to 10 per cent of all responses.
This general trend – a reduction in the number of passive
or ill-informed justifications, and an increased willingness to
bring hate speech or extremism online to the attention of social
media companies or the police – was reflected in the thematic
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Figure 14 Changes in types of action participants took in response
to civic judgement scenarios pre- and post-survey
(participant group n = 96 pre-survey, 73 post-survey,
comparison group n = 105 pre-survey, 88 post-survey)
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Figure 15 Changes in the extent to which participants agreed with statements to take in response to civic
judgement scenarios pre- and post-survey (n = 96 pre-survey, 73 post-survey; comparison group n
= 104 pre-survey, 88 post-survey)
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analysis. The proportion of justifications that could be 
regarded as passive declined from 34 per cent of all responses 
to 30 per cent, and for those involving escalation increased 
from 10 per cent to 15 per cent of all justifications for action
(figure 16).
Additional measures
In addition to these key impact areas, another measure of
confidence was included, by asking participants whether they
agreed with the statement:
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I feel comfortable socialising with people from different backgrounds 
to me.
Changing students’ attitudes towards people of different
backgrounds was not an objective of the intervention, but a
background measure of attitudes to provide context for the 
other observations, ultimately in order to ensure that the subject
matter of the interventions – which included discussions of 
white nationalism, racism and Islamist extremism – were not
socially divisive.
When asked whether participants agreed with the
statement ‘I feel comfortable socialising with people from
different backgrounds to me’, there was a 1 per cent and 3 per
cent change respectively for the comparison and participant
groups, in the pre- and post-survey, which in the case of the
comparison group was the only statistically significant change.
This small variation should be considered in the context of the
high baseline established in the pre-surveys, with an average level
of agreement of 6.25 and 6.23 out of 7 in the participant and
comparison groups respectively.
Process evaluation
As well as measuring whether the intervention had achieved its
core objectives, we examined the perspectives of the pupils and
teachers involved in it, and their experience of the workshops,
89
Figure 16 Changes in the types of justifications for action
participants took in response to civic judgement
scenarios pre- and post-survey (participant group n = 96
pre-survey, 73 post-survey; comparison group n = 104
pre-survey, 88 post-survey)
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through participant focus groups, teacher interviews and the
participant survey.
We did this to add context to the quantitative element of
the evaluation, to provide insights into the process of delivering
the workshops, and to solicit feedback to help revise and
improve the resources for future delivery.
The teacher interviews were also designed to examine the
extent to which the workshops met the needs of teachers, and to
gauge the capacity of teachers to deliver the workshops
themselves on the intended free distribution of the resources. In
all cases, interviewed teachers had been present for the delivery
of at least one workshop. In parallel, the focus groups with
participants provided a pre-eminent opportunity to judge the
success of the workshops, and examine from the most important
perspective, that of the pupils, what aspects of them might be
improved. All pupils involved in the focus groups had been
present at both workshops.
This quantitative and qualitative process-related feedback
presented a positive view of the workshops and provided a few
insights into how the programme might be modified for delivery
in future.
Relevance
We asked participants ‘How relevant do you feel the content of
the workshops was to you?’ They agreed overwhelmingly that
the workshops and the content covered in them was relevant to
them: 77 per cent said the content of the workshops was either
quite or highly relevant to them, with only 6 per cent responding
that it was quite or highly irrelevant; 15 per cent felt that the
content of the workshops was neither relevant nor irrelevant, and
2 per cent did not know (figure 17).
As well as stating that the material was relevant to them, a
number of participants observed that these skills were
particularly pertinent to them because of their age and the new
challenges presented by social media:
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Figure 17 Participants’ responses to the question ‘How relevant 
do you feel the content of the workshops was to you?’ 
(n = 66)
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It’s important for us to learn about this stuff now, so you know what to do in
future.
If I was an adult, obviously I’d know what to do, because you’d understand
the standards and whatever, but as a child we are vulnerable, we are more
easily manipulated, because we are pretty gullible, we’re really vulnerable.
I think it would be useful for younger kids as well, because they are on social
media a lot as well.
As well as feeling the intervention taught them important
skills, the great majority of participants thought that the
workshops were age appropriate: 92 per cent said the workshops
were appropriate for their age group; while 3 per cent felt they
were more appropriate for younger students, another 3 per cent
thought they were more appropriate for older students, and 2 per
cent did not know (figure 18).
This was mirrored in the focus groups, though there was
more division expressed over whether or not the intervention
should be delivered to younger pupils than suggested in the
survey. Some participants thought the intervention would be 
too sensitive or complex for younger pupils, while others felt
that because younger pupils regularly used social media, they
should be introduced to this kind of intervention earlier on in
school life:
I think we should have had it a bit earlier to be honest. I think actually this
year as a year group we’d take it in the way you’re trying to deliver it as
well. I don’t think anyone actually took it as offensive or felt it was too
sensitive. I think it was really good.
No [it’s not appropriate for younger students] because they won’t know what
it is yet.
[I think it is appropriate for younger students] because younger kids are on
social media a lot as well.
Evaluation
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Figure 18 Participant’s responses to the question ‘Do you feel like
the workshops were appropriate for your age group?’ 
(n = 64)
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They won’t be offended but in a way it’s not exactly comfortable listening
to… because they’re younger and more nervous. We’re older so we know how
to deal with it.
As well as suggesting that the content was valuable, the
teachers reinforced the conclusion of the participants that the
material was age appropriate. One teacher suggested that the
interventions would also be appropriate for younger and older
audiences:
Students are very good at judging what is good and what isn’t good for them
in relation to age appropriate responses. I felt that they were right in saying
this was not appropriate for a year 7 or 8 class, but I think for year 9 and
above it would be very appropriate, up to year 12. This age group in year 9
plus, because they’re all using social networking sites and are more used to
IT, they are actually able to make judgements.
Another teacher suggested that because of the decreasing
age at which young people are likely to first use social media,
teaching digital citizenship from the start of secondary school
was appropriate:
I always believe that equipping them with more knowledge at an earlier age
is better for our children so I’d even go to [age] 7.
Some participants observed that this kind of intervention
was particularly necessary in schools with a more mixed ethnic
and religious make-up. One pupil for example suggested that in
their school it was more important to talk about sensitive issues
to do with intolerance and extreme opinion,
Because our school here, it’s very multicultural. People are from different
ethnic groups, so you really want to talk about that a bit more.
Enjoyment
Participants reported high levels of enjoyment in taking part in the
workshops. This programme was a new experience for many of the
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pupils in the pilot schools. Most participants had discussed
extremism and radicalisation in some way in either RE, PSHE or
citizenship classes. Many had also had internet safety education
of some sort, but none had had an in depth discussion about
extremists’ use of the internet, their manipulative techniques or
the appropriate responses to extremism or hate speech online.
We asked participants ‘Did you enjoy taking part in the
workshops?’ A significant majority (80 per cent) either liked the
workshops or liked them a lot, while only 6 per cent disliked the
workshops, and none disliked them a lot; 14 per cent neither
liked nor disliked the workshops (figure 19).
Pupils’ enjoyment of the workshops was echoed in the
results of the focus groups:
I enjoyed them... they were interactive and they were visual and physical as
well – it was good.
They were really good, I felt like we learned new stuff and it was applicable.
It was good learning about social media and [online] behaviours, because
kids our age use it lots but we don’t learn about it.
This conclusion was reinforced by the class teachers; there
was a consensus among them that pupils enjoyed the sessions
and were engaged in the dialogue:
They really did enjoy it, looking at the focus group, the sessions, and what
you’ve done, it’s definitely been enjoyed.
The students said the examples were good, the conversation was good, and so
there was good engagement.
They were treated like adults, and they did actually really like that.
Although the majority of students were engaged in the
workshops, a minority of the students found it difficult to
participate in them because of the informal nature of the
discussion and the sensitivity of the subject matter. This was a
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Figure 19 Participants responses to the question ‘Did you enjoy
taking part in the workshops?’ (n = 66)
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challenge for those delivering the workshops. As one teacher 
put it:
I think out of that group you had, there were two that generally were
disengaged, didn’t follow it, didn’t want to certainly... yeah maybe two or
three maximum.
Another teacher repeated this observation, and suggested
that the layout of the classroom played a role:
I noticed some of them were standing on the side... it is difficult being aware
of the class dynamics, space... They knew there were other people there
watching them so that may have affected some of them speaking out more
than others.
Delivery
Participants gave positive feedback regarding the delivery of the
workshops. In a number of focus groups, pupils suggested that
having external practitioners involved in delivering the
workshops was beneficial, increasing the interest in the
workshops and changing the atmosphere:
The teachers, you always see them. It’s new people so it’s more interesting.
[It’s better] just because it’s different voices. Not as formal, more casual.
It worked because it was really casual, really natural and we were involved.
We’d rather you lot, because you’ve got more experience... professional as
well.
Some participants also suggested that they could talk more
openly about the more sensitive subjects touched on in the
workshops with external practitioners than they could with
teachers. One said that when talking about things like extremism
and hate speech, participants might feel they cannot say
everything they might:
It depends… you can’t exactly say (I don’t mean it in the wrong way)
everything because you’re afraid: am I allowed to say this?
With teachers you’ve got to be all quiet, you can’t just talk, this was more
interactive.
Interviewees also suggested that having an external
facilitator deliver the workshops, as with this pilot study and as
would occur in any commercial delivery option, had distinct
advantages as well as disadvantages, but that on balance it was
superior to the alternative of having the teacher deliver the
workshops. As one teacher put it,
I think it’s nice for students to have external speakers. Sometimes they pay
more attention to external visitors.
Another suggested that as a general rule for this kind of
intervention external speakers were preferable, but that the
appropriateness of having a teacher conduct the session varied
from teacher to teacher as some have a better relationship with
pupils than others:
They actually like having speakers because they can open up more, and the
fact that they’re not seeing you all the time makes them deal with the
situation being put to them differently. Sometimes I think it comes down to
the rapport the tutor has with the class, which can affect the dynamics, can
affect that session.
However, teachers were also aware that discussing sensitive
subjects with external facilitators could in some circumstances
make students less likely to speak their minds, as they do not
know the facilitators, but might have known their teachers for
many years:
I’ve been with this class for four years and they can say anything they like to
me and they know that, within parameters, I’m not going to be offended,
I’m never going to be offended by what they say. I’m always going to
Evaluation
challenge if I feel that that is not appropriate. [An external facilitator] won’t
have that in terms of that relationship.
It’s a trust thing, isn’t it? The students, especially with controversial issues
for them, they are very wary of strangers, they’re very wary of letting their
true feelings out.
Teachers were generally positive about the quality of the
delivery by the workshop facilitators. One suggested that the fact
that the facilitators delivering the workshops were relatively
young meant that they could relate well to the students, in turn
making the conversation more open and easy-going:
The fact that you had younger people, fantastic. The chemistry between the
two of them, as in always one was interspersing real experience in with the
delivery – perfect.
I thought the delivery was great because both [the delivery staff] were
enthusiastic, tolerant, patient and very passionate about the subject.
One criticism made was that during one of the first
workshops there was too much delivery of information and too
little dialogue: ‘[They] worked well as a team, just the only
negative was talking too much.’
Despite the positive reception and these positive reviews of
the workshops delivery, the fact that a large amount of
information conveyed in a short period of time created time
pressure, and some participants felt that the sessions were
sometimes rushed towards the end. Some participants thought
the revision element was crucial.
It felt a bit rushed.
Some stuff was easier than others. After you went over the information a
second time we remembered.
99
Like there wasn’t enough explaining some things… Just like being able to
summarise what’s been going on in the session, so it like recaps them a bit.
A number of the teachers interviewed agreed with the
participants that the volume of content delivered within the
workshops was significant. One teacher suggested that the subject
was complex enough to justify delivery and revision over ‘three to
four’ workshops.
Resources
Most teachers and participants regarded the resources deployed
in the workshops positively, but focus group participants had
mixed views on which of the two workshops they enjoyed most
and was delivered most effectively. The first workshop was based
around a digital slide deck, which presented social media
conversations interactively; the second was based on physical
cards laid out on the floor one by one in a conversation chain,
with all pupils participating as a single group. These are some of
the participants’ comments on them:
I’d say the second one [was better] because, again, everyone was more
involved in that. Whereas in the first one we were just all, you know, 
there’s a lot of information rather than doing the activities. So it was good in
that sense.
I thought cards were more interesting because we actually got physically
engaged.
I thought they were both good.
I go between the two because the one with the cards, when we got up to look
at the other people’s cards, it was too crowded.
Some suggested that more video content should be
included to help summarise learning points:
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I’d like more videos because personally I think they let us visualize it more
and understand it better.
While the students were divided on the subject of which
approaches were preferable, teachers were positive about the
interactive approaches deployed in general:
The presentation and the PowerPoint really worked, it was great because it
had animations in there, it had things they’d not seen… so they were
impressed with that. They liked the presentation.
They seemed to like the games. The game you had in the second session where
they choose particular scenarios, we do use that a lot in PSHE and we do
like it... It actually challenges them; it does actually make them think. It’s
quite philosophical isn’t it? It gets them to think about why. It tests those who
think ‘I don’t understand it’ and ‘I don’t know anything about this’. They
seemed to like that because it meant they all took part.
They seemed to like videos, they stressed they wanted more videos so I thought
that was good.
They seemed to have liked it [the first workshop], they enjoyed the
illustrations because they were all discussing [them] together.
Sensitivity
Throughout the workshops delivery staff had to be aware of, and
actively explore, the sensitivity of the subject in specific contexts
and classrooms. On the one hand, the more open the discussion,
and the more explicit it was about extremism, the more
constructive the dialogue. On the other hand, facilitators were
keen not to alienate or upset pupils, and were aware that if
poorly conducted such discussions could have a negative effect.
Teachers were confident that participants were not
offended by the content of the workshops or the way they were
presented, and that other potential participants would be
unlikely to be offended:
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We as teachers think that pupils are afraid that they don’t want to talk about
[extremism], but they do want to talk about it and it’s important that they
have their say, rather than blame the students or actually say oh well it’s too
sensitive or we shouldn’t cover it.
However, some teachers were unwilling to discuss
particularly sensitive issues, such as violent extremism. One
outlined why teachers from particular backgrounds might be
more or less willing to engage in certain conversations on values
and beliefs, or political or social phenomena related to identity:
Every school will have their fears and their sensitivities and might say we
will only act when something happens... Some staff suggest to me that it
might be OK for me to talk about particular topics, coming from a
particular ethnic background and being Muslim – I can get away with
saying particular things and it won’t be seen that I’m being offensive.
Whereas quite a few members of staff might feel sensitive, for example
thinking ‘Well I don’t really feel I should say that, is it my place to say that?
How will it sound?’ So instead of just going along and trying it, they’re
saying, ‘I’m not going to go there.’
The observation that teachers might well not be willing to
discuss certain important but sensitive issues related to values
and beliefs is itself an additional argument for using external
facilitators to deliver the workshops.
These workshops were delivered at a time of changing
school policies and duties on extremism and radicalisation, and
changes in the way use of technology by students is approached
in schools. Mobile phones had recently been banned in two of
the schools that participated in the pilot study. Teachers were
aware, however, that schools cannot see their role as merely
reducing access to social media or enforcing behaviour
management, but must also teach young people how to use
important social media resources safely and effectively. One
teacher highlighted how reduced access to social media in school
could not itself be the solution:
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They are no longer allowed to use mobile phones in school. This is the first
year where we’ve decided not to allow that. That was simply because, simply
because their behaviour as well as cyber bullying cases... I’ve felt that it has
actually made a big difference evaluating this year and how it’s gone. But
we have had cases obviously of when they go home, they will for example
want to send a text message to another student outside. And then sometimes
it becomes an in-school issue because it starts to grow.
While teachers recognised that some staff members might
be reluctant to address issues of extremism and radicalisation in
such a direct way, teachers acknowledged that discussing these
issues in class was important, and that the workshops delivered
as part of the pilot project represented a vehicle through which
to address a number of areas that schools are specifically
concerned with, from British values to the citizenship curriculum
and elements of schools’ spiritual, moral, social and cultural
obligations:
I think for the moment the school’s agenda and Ofsted means you are in a
very advantageous position… because you can say we’re covering anti-
radicalisation, cyber bullying or internet safety, but also making pupils
aware of what’s going on out there in terms of social networking, which they
do need to know, especially nowadays. Citizenship is compulsory anyway.
Safeguarding is a priority now in schools, so if you incorporate that into
safeguarding and British values, which seems to be the big thing the
government is talking about at the moment and wanting us to deliver…
The Prevent context
Teachers had varied understandings of and opinions on the
Prevent strategy and its implications, but understood how this
programme might reinforce and support its objectives, and why
it was being pursued in schools. In all of the schools, teachers
were aware of why this kind of intervention might be useful in
their school specifically. One teacher suggested that if the
Prevent programme and schools’ new duties under it was making
schools talk about issues of extremism and radicalisation, that
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was a positive thing: ‘Prevent is positive in making schools
deliver [safeguarding].’
However, it was also suggested that the duties on schools
could reduce the space for debate by increasing worry among
children and parents that engaging in such a debate might have
negative impacts for students, and make them reluctant to talk
about these issues. Moreover, concerned about their
safeguarding role, teachers might be less willing to solicit
potentially extreme views from students:
It does have its disadvantages, where you have parents [who] don’t want
their children to open up to talk about particular subjects because they fear
that if they say something, ‘Oh they might be seen to be extremists and might
be reported’ and some Muslim parents may deliberately tell their children
‘Do not take part in conversations like that’ because it might get them into
trouble. It’s OK to have that freedom of speech and to ask that question but
we do need to be careful because if you do get a particular person who is
saying that particular phrase [on] more than one occasion and it kind of
develops into a hate thing, then actually we do need to be worried.
This feedback reinforces the case for guidance and subject-
specific delivery from specialised external partners.
Evaluation
6 Conclusion
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This project set out to develop, test and evaluate new resources
to help schools deliver their Prevent duty. It sought to fill a gap
within the existing landscape of CVE and digital citizenship
resources and aimed to establish a new, evidence-based and
effective skills-based digital citizenship intervention, designed to
increase the resilience of young people to extremism and radical-
isation online. It further attempted to advance the evidence base
in this area, to support future intervention development.
As the evaluative evidence demonstrates, our pilot
intervention was broadly successful in achieving the objectives
set out at the beginning of the project. In all three areas of
impact that were the focus of the intervention – critical thinking
skills, online responsibilities and how social media change how
we communicate – we achieved statistically significant impacts.
Teachers viewed the workshops favourably, and participants felt
they were relevant, and understood and enjoyed them.
The evaluation will also inform the further development
and improvement of these resources in the future. Demos plans
to expand this series of workshops from two to three sessions, in
order to allow for a greater degree of revision and review of the
content. Demos further plans to develop more holistic teacher
guidance and supporting documentation in order to reduce the
knowledge threshold required for teachers to deliver these
resources themselves. Following the success of this intervention,
and having made revisions to these resources, Demos plans to
deliver our interventions in schools in partnership with Bold
Creative, and make these resources available online for free.
Our evaluation has added to the public evidence base
regarding Prevent interventions in a school context, an area
where very little evidence exists. Moreover, our best practice
review and examination of existing, related interventions has
allowed us to identify the general characteristics of a successful
intervention related to extremism and its online aspects. The lack
of evidence on what does and does not work in counter-
extremism interventions in schools has been a barrier to effective
intervention development. We hope that those developing future
interventions consider the evidence presented in this report and
in doing so increase the impact of their own projects.
This project has wider implications for CVE in schools.
Currently, the focus of Prevent interventions delivered in schools
is overwhelmingly values based, and is indeed often tied into the
British values agenda. This is a difficult space, in which complex
and abstracted notions of identity, political and religious beliefs
collide. Our project has demonstrated how – alongside
interventions focused on the creation of positive narratives or
discussions of identity – digital citizenship education can play a
core role in the delivery of the Prevent duty in schools, in a
manner which builds up wider critical skills, does not alienate
pupils, and cuts to the heart of the problem of online extremism
and radicalisation. What is more, teachers and students recognise
the importance of this subject and are keen to engage with it.
Digital citizenship education is not just an effective way to
increase the resilience of young people to extremism. It can
create more critical citizens, informed consumers and
community-minded social media users. The skills developed
through digital citizenship education apply not just to the fight
against extremism on the margins of our society – they present
an important way to reduce the political polarisation that runs
through the heart of it. The Prevent duty on schools is still new,
and schools are still adapting to their new responsibilities. As
they do so, digital citizenship should sit at the heart of their
efforts.
Conclusion
Technical appendix
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Demos designed the comparison and participant surveys used in
the evaluation of this pilot, and piloted early drafts of them with
a focus group of young people in order to ensure their relevance
and accessibility, although with insufficient numbers to test
statistical validity. Teachers delivered the surveys, which
participants returned by post. We informed respondents from
the participant groups that the surveys would help us assess the
workshops, and told respondents from the comparison group
that the surveys would help us assess workshops going on in
their school, which may have influenced their responses.
In the pre- and post-surveys, there were two and four main
question sections respectively, each of which sought different
types of quantitative data.
We first asked respondents to provide basic administrative
information, such as the date and the school they went to; in the
post-survey we asked them to state whether they had attended
the first and second workshops.
In the first question section, we presented respondents in
both the pre- and post-surveys with a series of four social media
scenarios, each of which involved digital citizenship in the
context of extremism or hate speech. In each case, we asked
participants to choose from a list of 11 actions they would take
when confronted with the scenario, and 11 associated
justifications for this action. The details and analysis of these
questions is explained in more detail in chapter 5.
The second section in both the pre- and post-surveys
presented respondents with a series of seven-point Likert scales,
ranging from strongly agree (7) to strongly disagree (1), each
measuring their level of agreement with ten statements. Nine
were impact measures, and one, ‘I feel comfortable socialising
with people from different backgrounds to me’, provided
contextual data. These questions concerned social media habits,
as in the statement ‘I actively seek out and understand
viewpoints that differ from my own’, or levels of confidence
about certain skills, for example, ‘I am confident I know how to
differentiate between truth and lies on social media.’ Demos
designed these questions to provide a robust measure of impact.
In the third section of the post-survey only, we presented
respondents with two questions, asking them to list as many of
the three methods of manipulation and the three principles of
digital savviness as they could. We designed these questions to
measure the degree of short-term knowledge recall of the precise
terms participants learned. The recall of these terms is not a
critical part of the intervention, but through measuring levels of
recall, researchers could observe which parts of the intervention
had been remembered most successfully, and rebalance the
intervention accordingly for future delivery.
In the fourth section of the post-survey only we asked
respondents a series of process questions on their experience of
the workshops, asking them to rate their approval on a series of
Likert scales of four to six points. Some questions were also
relevant to impact measurement, such as ‘Do you feel like you
learned new skills or gained knowledge from the workshops?’
and some related directly to the delivery process, such as ‘Did
you enjoy taking part in the workshops?’ We designed these
questions to help Demos researchers understand the strengths
and weakness of the delivery and modify the resources for future
delivery accordingly.
These questions were based on the process evaluation
questions deployed in previous Demos evaluations and modified
for this intervention. With quantitative process measures, it is
important to consider what might be a measure of success, as
successful effect is less self-evident in process evaluation than in
impact measurement. In the planning stages of the intervention,
Demos set the goal of achieving an 80 per cent positive response
to process questions as the standard for success on that measure.
Technical appendix
Significance testing
Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter and the need for
anonymity, pre- and post-survey data was anonymous and
collected as unmatched data, within both the participant group
and the comparison groups. This means that significance testing
that compares changes in the participant group with changes in
the comparison group was not possible. Instead we used the
Mann Whitney Wilcoxon test for significance testing of the pre-
and post-survey results of the participant group, with the
comparison group serving as an indicator of other changes
within the schools in question.
The same four classes undertook the pre- and post-surveys,
and all respondents in the participant group post-survey had
attended both workshops as part of the programme, granting a
high degree of similarity. We used Morris’ (2008) preferred
formula for pretest-posttest-control group research designs to
calculate standardised effect sizes for each measure.98 Table 1
shows the effect size calculations and the percentage change
between pre- and post-surveys in both groups.
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Table 1 Effect size calculations, based on Likert responses in the pre- and post-surveys (1–7 Likert scale, 1
strongly disagree – 7 strongly agree)
‘I feel comfortable ‘I actively seek out ‘When I post, share, ‘I understand what I would know what 
socialising with and understand or distribute behaving well to do if I’m 
people from viewpoints that messages online, online consists of’ confronted with
different back- differ from my own’ I think about how hate speech online’
grounds to me’ they might affect 
other people’
Participant 6.25 5.223404 5.452632 6.244681 5.052632
pre-survey
Participant 6.283784 5.394366 5.30137 6.263889 5.575342
post-survey
Participant % 1% 3% -3% 0% 0%
change
WMW test* 0.7776 0.3827 0.4669 0.8171 0.0200
p-value
Comparison 6.228571 5.192308 5.359223 6.240385 5.384615 
pre-survey
Comparison 6.431818 5.159091 5.655172 6.303371 5.168539
post-survey
Comparison 3% -1% 6% 1% - 4% 5%
% change
WMW test 0.0473 0.9297 0.1836 0.4911 0.5006
p-value 
T
echnical ap
p
end
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Table 1 Effect size calculations, based on Likert responses in the pre- and post-surveys (1–7 Likert scale, 1
strongly disagree – 7 strongly agree) – continued
‘I feel comfortable ‘I actively seek out ‘When I post, share, ‘I understand what I would know what 
socialising with and understand or distribute behaving well to do if I’m 
people from viewpoints that messages online, online consists of’ confronted with
different back- differ from my own’ I think about how hate speech online’
grounds to me’ they might affect 
other people’
Pre-participant 0.3349 0.7285 0.7066 0.7886 0.0828
and comparison 
group comparison 
(WMW test p-value)
Morris effect 
size calculation
Treatment 0.033784 0.170962 -0.151262 0.019208 0.52271
difference of means
Control difference 0.203247 -0.033217 0.295949 0.062986 -0.216076
of means
Difference of -0.169463 0.204179 -0.447211 -0.043778 0.738786
difference
Pooled pre-test 1.200207 1.421843 1.582806 1.074576 1.566294
standard deviation
Effect size –0.141194811 0.143601649 -0.282543154 -0.040739789 0.471677731
* Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
Table 1 Effect size calculations, based on Likert responses in the pre- and post-surveys (1–7 Likert scale, 1
strongly disagree – 7 strongly agree) – continued
‘I am confident I ‘I am confident that ‘I understand what ‘I understand what ‘I understand what 
know how to I could challenge techniques are an echo chamber being a keyboard 
differentiate extremist opinions used to manipulate is’ warrior is.’
between truth and online’ people on social
lies on social media’ media’
Participant 5.225806 4.434783 5.043011 1.752688 4.138298
pre-survey
Participant
post-survey 5.760563 4.863014 5.671429 5.328767 6.123288
Participant % 
change 10% 10% 12% 204% 48%
WMW test* 
p-value 0.0199 0.1018 0.0053 <0.0001 <0.0001
Comparison
pre-survey 5.384615 4.37 5.211538 2.883495 4.582524
Comparison 
post-survey 5.662921 4.528736 5.352273 2.94186 5.116279
Comparison 
% change 5% 4% 3% 2% 12%
WMW test 
p-value 0.0874 0.5641 0.8403 0.9037 0.1572
T
echnical ap
p
end
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Table 1 Effect size calculations, based on Likert responses in the pre- and post-surveys (1–7 Likert scale, 1
strongly disagree – 7 strongly agree) – continued
‘I am confident I ‘I am confident that ‘I understand what ‘I understand what ‘I understand what 
know how to I could challenge techniques are an echo chamber being a keyboard 
differentiate extremist opinions used to manipulate is’ warrior is.’
between truth and online’ people on social
lies on social media’ media’
Pre-participant 
and comparison 
group comparison 
(WMW test p-value) 0.5492 0.8279 0.2086 <0.0001 0.1994
Morris effect size 
calculation
Treatment 0.534757 0.428231 0.628418 3.576079 1.98499 
difference of means
Control difference 0.278306 0.158736 0.140735 0.058365 0.533755 
of means
Difference of 0.256451 0.269495 0.487683 3.517714 1.451235 
difference
Pooled pre-test 
standard deviation 1.500181 1.716118 1.504731 2.202428 2.338366
Effect size 0.170946706 0.15703757 0.324099789 1.597198183 0.62061927
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Licence (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, granted under the terms of
this Licence), and this Licence will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as stated
above.
8 Miscellaneous
A Each time You distribute or publicly digitally perform the Work or a Collective Work, Demos
offers to the recipient a licence to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the licence
granted to You under this Licence.
B If any provision of this Licence is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall not
affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this Licence, and without
further action by the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the
minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable.
C No term or provision of this Licence shall be deemed waived and no breach consented to
unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged with
such waiver or consent.
D This Licence constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work
licenced here. There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to
the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that
may appear in any communication from You. This Licence may not be modified without the
mutual written agreement of Demos and You.
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“There is an urgent need
for schools to develop
digital citizenship in our
young people…”
DIGITAL CITIZENS:
COUNTERING EXTREMISM
ONLINE
Louis Reynolds
Ralph Scott
The last half a century has witnessed a burgeoning information
revolution that has transformed our societies beyond recognition.
The development of sophisticated computing, the technological
reorientation of vast segments of the global workforce, the invention
of the internet and most recently the proliferation of social media
technology has radically changed the ways we work, live, develop
and communicate. Political extremism and violent radicalism have
not been excluded from this growing trend, with social media being
used as a tool for the recruitment and exploitation of young people
by extremist groups.
As a result, the development of digital citizenship in our young
people, to help them navigate these new online challenges, has
become an urgent need. British schools are responsible for
identifying and building resilience against radicalisation as part of
their duty of care. Many of the skills required to combat the
influence of extremism and the ability of terrorist groups to exploit
and manipulate young people are already taught in schools, through
existing personal, social, health and economic (PSHE) education
and citizenship efforts, the British values agenda and the work of
individual school leaders and teachers. However, there is a dearth of
high quality resources designed to increase the resilience of young
people to extremism and radicalisation in a digital context.
This report summarises the results of a pilot project which seeks
to address this gap by developing, testing and evaluating new
resources to help schools tackle online radicalisation. Based on the
analysis of a survey of existing materials and a best practise review, it
presents a digital citizenship intervention, developed by Demos and
Bold Creative, designed to build this resilience to extremism, and
measures its impact through a pilot study delivered in schools.At a
time when the growth of social media combined with the influence
of extremism makes it more important than ever, this report adds to
the public evidence base regarding counter-extremism interventions
in a school context, and contributes to the development of effective
education for digital citizenship. 
Ralph Scott is Head of the Citizenship programme at Demos. 
Louis Reynolds is a researcher in the Citizenship programme.
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